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Homophily is (not) Bad for Learning
Abstract
The consensus in the social learning literature is that homophily –defined as the tendency
of people to associate more with those who are similar to themselves– is not conducive to
learning. This is because increasing homophily leads to a more segregated society and insu-
lar communities that cannot efficiently aggregate information. In this paper, we show that
this common view of homophily is inaccurate when some of the information that agents use
to learn the state of the world is provided by a strategic actor who may be interested in dis-
torting their learning process for his own gain. In this setting, increased homophily has an
ambiguous effect on learning, and can even protect agents from misinformation and help
them learn the state of the world. This finding stands in stark contrast to almost all of the
social learning literature on homophily, with potential policy implications. For example, we
show that a policy maker may not want to encourage the integration of highly-segregated
communities if this integration will only slightly reduce homophily, as this might actually fa-
cilitate the spread of misinformation. We use our model to propose optimal policies that try
to stop this spread of misinformation, and show that these policies might require creating
inequality –defined as unequal access to network resources– in the population.
1 Introduction
The central question of the social learning literature is whether a society or a group of people
will manage to learn an unknown state of the world.1 Agents update their beliefs about this state
based on their own information (that they obtain from news sources) as well as from communi-
cating with their friends, and various results exist that detail when learning is or is not possible,
with a specific emphasis on how homophily –the tendency of people to associate with those
who are similar to themselves– impacts the ability of agents to learn. The consensus is that ho-
mophily is disadvantageous to learning (e.g. Golub and Jackson (2012)), since it results in agents
being less exposed to different opinions and beliefs, which slows down the learning process and
leads to echo chamber effects.
The prevailing assumption in all of the previous literature is that the news that agents obtain
are organic: it may or may not be accurate, but it is provided by sources that have no stake in
1For example, whether temperatures on earth are increasing over time, as stated in Golub and Jackson (2012).
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what the agents’ beliefs are. In reality, such sources are rarely neutral, and may have an interest
in shaping these beliefs in order to direct agents towards taking certain actions. The interference
of Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 US presidential election is one example of such belief manip-
ulation. Similarly, recent outbreaks of measles in Eastern Europe and parts of the US have been
linked to Russian interference and propaganda whose goal is to convince people that vaccines
are harmful in order to make them opt against vaccinating themselves and their children.2
This paper combines the two ingredients from the previous paragraphs to answer the fol-
lowing question: if a strategic actor – a principal – tampers with the learning process in order
to get agents to mislearn the state of the world, and if this happens in the presence of a phe-
nomenon (homophily) that is believed to be bad for learning the state of the world, then does
that make things doubly worse for the agents? As we show, the somewhat unexpected answer
is no. Homophily, long regarded as a negative and undesirable force in social learning, has an
ambiguous effect when information is provided to agents by strategic sources, and can some
times even shield agents from misinformation. This novel finding is particularly compelling be-
cause of its potential consequences to social and economic policy: in addition to its effects on
learning, homophily is also connected to segregation in society (Currarini et al. (2009)), which
leads to well-documented economic inequality.3 This makes it natural to suggest policies that
alleviate the negative effects of homophily, but as we show, efforts to integrate communities can
end up making society as a whole more prone to misinformation.
The model we develop in this paper builds upon the work of Chandrasekhar et al. (2019) and
Mostagir et al. (2019). The first paper shows, experimentally, that agents update their beliefs in
ways that are consistent with Bayesian or DeGroot updating,4 and suggests that the proportion
of agent types in society may be driven by contextual factors (e.g. level of education). The latter
paper takes this finding and builds a theoretical model where a principal tries to manipulate a
society with mixed learning types, and shows that Bayesian agents are never manipulated and
that, once they figure out the true state of the world, can help spread this knowledge to other
agents. Whether these other agents are affected by misinformation is a function of the (deter-
ministic and known) social network structure.
In this paper, we assume no knowledge of the network structure; instead, we assume that
the network is generated randomly from a distribution and exploit the connection between ran-
2https://www.newsweek.com/russian-trolls-promoted-anti-vaccination-propaganda-measles-outbreak-1332016
3Wage inequality and differences in labor market participation across different groups are documented in Card
and Krueger (1992); Chandra (2000), and Heckman et al. (2000). Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Calvo´-
Armengol and Jackson (2007) show that these inequalities can be explained through network models of homophily.
4A Bayesian agent integrates the opinions of her friends using Bayes’ law, while a less-sophisticated DeGroot agent
takes the opinions of her friends on face value and incorporates them into her own beliefs through a weighted aver-
age.
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dom graphs and homophily to examine the effects of the latter on the spread of misinformation.
The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that, by protecting other agents from manip-
ulation, Bayesian agents serve as a resource for their communities. This gives rise to a natural
definition of inequality that is rooted in homophily: “affluent” communities with easy access
to Bayesian agents are more likely to be protected against misinformation, but if homophily is
too high and communities become more insular, then vulnerable communities with few or no
Bayesians will have little access to the more affluent communities and their resources. How does
this affect the spread of misinformation in the individual communities and society as a whole?
The above setup naturally gives rise to important questions about resource allocation and
policy interventions. Should a social planner try to curb the spread of misinformation by en-
couraging the integration of different communities (i.e. by decreasing homophily)? Or by en-
dowing some agents in the network with “Bayesian abilities” (for example through education or
increasing awareness), and how should these agents be selected? As we discuss next, while these
questions are simple to state, their corresponding answers are not straightforward.
Contribution and Overview of Results. In this paper, we consider the manipulation and learn-
ing questions presented above in the presence of homophily, arguably a more realistic represen-
tation of real-world networks (see Marsden (1987); McPherson et al. (2001)). In the process, we
develop new technical results and generate novel insights that invite a rethinking of the role that
homophily plays in social learning.
In particular, the paper makes three types of contributions:
Methodological: Our methodological contribution answers the following question: Given a
random network model, what is the likelihood that any realized network from this model will
be susceptible to misinformation? Theorem 1 is a technical result that shows that under cer-
tain regularity conditions, studying manipulation in these random networks can be reduced to
applying a centrality measure to the average network, which greatly simplifies their analyses.
This result is quite useful because, unlike prior work (e.g. Mostagir et al. (2019)), it assumes
no direct knowledge of the network and is robust to changes in the network structure, which
makes our model well-suited to the fact that social networks are rarely static configurations;
people break ties and form new relationships over time, and the network structure itself is con-
stantly evolving. Our work provides a technical reduction that allows us to study these more
realistic models of network formation.
Conceptual: With Theorem 1 in hand, we turn our attention to studying the effects of ho-
mophily on the spread of misinformation. We start by giving a definition of inequality as a mea-
3
sure of how communities differ in their access to Bayesian agents, which is shaped by how those
agents are distributed in the different communities and by the level of homophily in society.
Our main conceptual finding in Theorem 2 is that the effect of inequality is not monotone: ma-
nipulation is quite difficult when there is little inequality or when there is extreme inequality,
but agents can be manipulated as the level of inequality falls in some intermediate range. This
non-monotonicity is shaped by a combination of network connectivity and the principal’s costs
of sending misinformation to the agents. When there is little inequality, manipulation is quite
difficult because information flows freely, and Bayesian agents anywhere in the network can ex-
ert the influence necessary for other agents to learn the true state of the world and overcome
any misinformation injected by the principal. At the other extreme, when inequality is very high
and agents form insular communities, manipulation can still be difficult for the principal be-
cause he cannot use the network to his advantage when spreading propaganda. Instead, he has
to target communities individually and, as we show, might end up having no profitable strat-
egy for manipulating any one in the population. When inequality is in an intermediate range
is where things align for the principal’s objective. Connectivity is not too high, which prevents
influence from the Bayesians scattered through the network, but at the same time the network
is connected enough that the principal gets more “bang for his buck”, i.e. he only has to target
a small subset of agents with misinformation, but can then rely on the homophily structure and
the resulting connectivity to spread this misinformation throughout the network.
We then show in Theorem 3 that the narrative of homophily being bad for learning can be
recovered in our model, albeit under special conditions. When these conditions do not hold,
homophily can again lead to an improvement in learning. This non-monotonicity and the gen-
erally ambiguous role that homophily plays in learning and the spread of misinformation has a
non-trivial impact on possible network interventions, as we discuss next.
Policy Implications: The findings from our model can be used as input to policy makers try-
ing to curb manipulation. By understanding the homophily structure of society, policy makers
can best direct their resources towards interventions that will protect this society from misinfor-
mation. We consider two natural interventions: first, increasing connectivity across communi-
ties in order to make the network less segregated and provide more access to Bayesian agents,
and second, educating specific agents in the network who will then serve as Bayesian agents to
protect their (and potentially other) communities.
As we show in Section 5, some of the optimal policy recommendations that arise from these
interventions are initially not intuitive. For example, a policy maker may not want to encour-
age the integration of highly-segregated communities if this integration will only slightly reduce
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homophily. This is because, as mentioned earlier, moving society from a highly-homophilous,
highly-segregated regime to an intermediate homophily regime may make society as a whole
more susceptible to misinformation. Thus, while the desire to reduce homophily is reasonable
both from a normative perspective and based on the literature cited earlier, our model suggests
that it should only be acted upon if the degree of homophily can be drastically reduced, other-
wise the intervention will result in the opposite effect for which it was designed.
As another example, we show in Section 5.1 that it may sometimes be better for a policy
maker to willfully create inequality in how she spends her budget and how the Bayesian agents
are allocated across communities. By unevenly splitting the budget across communities, society
as a whole becomes more impervious to manipulation compared to the case where the bud-
get is evenly split. This and other examples demonstrate how subtle deviations from our main
theorems can lead to unexpected policy recommendations.
Related Literature The seminal paper of Golub and Jackson (2012) shows the negative effects
that homophily has on a society that learns in a DeGroot fashion. Instead of learning rates, our
focus is on understanding the role of homophily in whether a network is impervious to manip-
ulation in the limit, and when information is potentially provided by a strategic source. Lobel
and Sadler (2015) show how the role of homophily in a sequential learning model depends on
the density of the network. Homophily in that paper is used to describe alignment of prefer-
ences over the agents’ decision problem, e.g. an agent who is deciding on a restaurant weighs
the opinion of her friend differently if she and her friend prefer the same type of food, whereas
homophily in our model captures similarities along dimensions (race, age, profession, income,
etc.) that can be orthogonal to whatever state the agents are trying to learn.
Bayesian agents in our model are stubborn agents who know the truth. Opinion dynamics
with stubborn agents have been studied in Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Yildiz et al. (2013) among
others. The recent work of Sadler (2019) extends Yildiz et al. (2013) to random graphs. What
differentiates our paper from this literature is the presence of a strategic principal, which gives
rise to completely different learning dynamics and implications.
There is recent work on fake news and manipulation. In Candogan and Drakopoulos (2017)
and Papanastasiou (2020), there is no strategic news provider; fake news already exists in the
system and the focus is on how it can be identified and controlled. Keppo et al. (2019) pay less
attention to the social and network aspect and focus instead on how how Bayesian agents can be
manipulated through selective information dissemination. The manipulation problem as pre-
sented in our paper was introduced in Mostagir et al. (2019). In that paper, agents interact over a
fixed network topology and conditions on that topology are provided to determine whether the
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agents will be affected by misinformation. Our paper embeds this model in a random network
structure in order to study the role of homophily in the spread of misinformation. In addition,
our paper provides a prescriptive component to evaluate which policies may be effective in stop-
ping the spread of misinformation as a function of inequality in society. As mentioned earlier,
these policies also speak to issues of community integration and resource allocation.
Our paper assumes no knowledge of the network structure, but of the random process from
which the network is generated. There is recent literature that tries to recover the network struc-
ture from relational data, e.g. Alidaee et al. (2020); Ata et al. (2018) consider a seller who does
not know the network structure but, in the presence of externalities, estimates it from transac-
tion data. Other recent work, e.g. Auerbach (2019), tests whether a network was generated from
an inhomogeneous random graph model (which includes the class of stochastic block matrices
commonly used to model homophily). These methods can be used to estimate the structure of
homophily in society and applied as input to our model.
Finally, our paper is also related to diffusion and seeding in random networks, as exemplified
by the recent work of Manshadi et al. (2018), Akbarpour et al. (2018), and Sadler (2019). These
papers consider the classic problem of which agents to select in order to spread information
throughout the network. The primary difference with our work is that we consider an adversar-
ial, strategic principal who is trying to spread his own influence in the network, and our goal is
to identify conditions and policies under which we can stop this principal from spreading mis-
information, with a specific emphasis on the role of homophily and the social structure of the
network in propagating such information.
Organization As mentioned, our paper builds on the model of Mostagir et al. (2019), so we
present a summary of that model and the necessary definitions and results in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the random network formation process and provides regularity conditions un-
der which the study of random networks can be reduced to the study of the average network. We
use this reduction to study the effects of different models of homophily on learning in Section 4.
We then discuss possible interventions to prevent the spread of misinformation in Section 5 and
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Deterministic Networks: Reduced-Form Model and Solution
We build a framework that embeds the model of Mostagir et al. (2019) into a random network
formation model. This random network model is introduced in Section 3, but to make the paper
self-contained, we present here a high-level summary of the primitives and results from Mosta-
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Agent
R S
State y
R 1, 1 + b 0, 0
S 1, b 0, 1
Table 1. Terminal Payoffs. The parameter b is in [−1, 1].
gir et al. (2019) that are releveant for our setup.5 The preliminaries presented below assume con-
nectivity in a deterministic network of known topology, and we provide conditions in Section 3
that guarantee that the realized random network is connected with high probability.
We consider a social network with n agents trying to learn a binary state of the world y ∈
{S,R} over time. Time is continuous and agents learn over a finite horizon, t ∈ [0, T ). At time
t = 0, the underlying state y ∈ {S,R} is drawn, with P(y = S) = q ∈ (0, 1). Agents try to learn
the state of the world in order to take an action at time T , with the goal of taking the action
that matches the true state, i.e. take action S if the state is S or action R if the state is R.6 The
principal is interested in agents taking actionR regardless of what the state of the world is. These
payoffs are represented in Table 1, where the two numbers in each cell represent the payoffs to
the principal and to the agent, respectively, for the state of nature and agent action combination
corresponding to that cell. From the table, we can see that an agent would take action R if her
belief that the true state is R is at least equal to 1−b2 . Equivalently, she would take action S if her
belief that the true state is S is at least equal to 1+b2 .
News Agents receive news over time in the form of signals, where sit ∈ {S,R} is the signal that
agent i receives at time t. News is either organic or strategic. Organic news is informative and is
generated from a process that is correlated with the state of the world, and we assume that the
probability that sit correctly represents that state is strictly greater than 1/2. However, a principal
may choose specific agents in the network and jam their news process by periodically sending
them message yˆ ∈ {S,R} that corresponds to the state that he would like them to believe. Impor-
tantly, agents who are targeted by the principal do not know that they are targeted and cannot
tell whether a signal they are receiving is organic or strategic. This is akin to agents scrolling
through their news feed and seeing both organic and strategic stories without knowing which
stories are which.
5For completeness, we include the full technical details in Appendix A.1. These details (e.g. arrival rates of news,
explicit form of DeGroot updating, etc.) are not pertinent for our goals but we include them in the appendix for the
interested reader.
6For example, as in Mostagir et al. (2019), they want to learn whether a particular vaccine is safe (state of the world
y = S) so that they vaccinate (take action S) or whether a vaccine is risky (state of the world y = R) so that they would
choose to avoid vaccination (take action R).
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Manipulation The principal picks an influence strategy xi ∈ {0, 1} for each agent i in the net-
work, where xi = 1 indicates that agent i is targeted by the principal, so that some of the news
she receives is strategic. The principal may play any influence strategy x ≡ {xi}ni=1 over the net-
work, and incurs an upfront investment cost ε > 0 for each agent with xi = 1, thus the utility of
the principal is the number of agents taking action R less total investment cost.
Agent i is manipulated if she would figure out the correct state in the absence of interference
from the principal (i.e. when x = 0), but would mislearn the state when the principal has a
profitable network strategy x 6= 0. Notice that the agent does not have to be directly targeted by
the principal to be manipulated.
A network is impervious to manipulation if no agents can be manipulated, i.e. if there is no
profitable strategy for the principal that results in any agent mislearning the true state.
Learning Society consists of two types of agents. Bayesian agents always learn the state of the
world correctly and become stubborn agents as in Theorem 1 of Mostagir et al. (2019). We pro-
vide conditions in Appendix A.3 that guarantee that this result extends to the random network
domain.
DeGroot agents follow the model of Jadbabaie et al. (2012), with two components that go into
their learning and belief update process. The first component comes from the DeGroot agent’s
own personal experience, which is a Bayesian update on the true state taking the information
received (personally) at face value. Given a vector of signals si,t, we denote this personal expe-
rience by BU(si,t). The second comes from a linear aggregation of the opinions from friends.
These components are detailed in Appendix A.1. In general, for periods of new information
τ = 1, 2, . . ., we assume DeGroot agent i updates her beliefs pii,τ+1 at time τ + 1 as follows:
pii,τ+1 = θi · BU(si,τ ) +
n∑
i=1
αijpij,τ
where θi is the weight that agent i places on her own Bayesian update and θi +
∑n
j=1 αij = 1.
DeGroot Centrality Determining whether an agent is manipulated is equivalent to computing
her limit belief of the incorrect state and checking whether the belief is higher than the cutoff
obtained from the payoff table. One key contribution in Mostagir et al. (2019) is DeGroot Cen-
trality (DC), which is a generalization of Katz-Bonacich centrality and can be computed in the
same way using weighted walks (see Jackson (2010), Figures 1 and 2 in this paper, and the expres-
sion for limit beliefs in Appendix A.1). DeGroot Centrality captures how the network structure
propagates the principal’s injected signals to any specific agent; it corresponds to how much
influence other DeGroots (who receive these signals) have on agent i’s own belief, and under
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appropriate normalization, DC is exactly equal to that agent’s belief of the incorrect state. This
means that agents with high DC are those most vulnerable to manipulation, while the closer a
DeGroot agent is to a Bayesian agent, the lower their DC is and therefore the more resistant to
manipulation they become.
Based on the previous paragraph, characterizing manipulation in deterministic networks be-
comes an exercise in computing the DC of agents. With the network forming randomly however,
there is no easy way to determine which agents will have high DC and which agents to target
for intervention. The following section shows that under some regularity conditions, we can
overcome this difficulty by reducing the study of the random network to studying the average
network instead.
3 Random Networks: Model and Theory
Models of homophily are traditionally built on top of random network formation models (see,
for e.g. Golub and Jackson (2012). In this section, we introduce the theoretical foundations for
our random network model and give our main technical result in Theorem 1, which allows us to
study the role of homophily in learning and manipulation. We start by defining some notation
for a random network model on n agents. This random network is specified by a matrix ρ of link
probabilities, where
ρ =

ρ11 ρ12 . . . ρ1n
ρ21 ρ22 . . . ρ2n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρn1 ρn2 . . . ρnn

with the probability that agent i listens to agent j equal to ρij . We let aij ∈ {0, 1} denote whether
a link from i to j is realized. Take χ to be any sequence of realized links (ai1j1 , ai2j2 , · · · , aikjk),
and moreover let χ−ij denote the set of χ where both aij and aji do not appear. For additional
simplification, we impose:
Assumption 1. For every i, j, the conditional probability of link formation satisfiesP[aij = 1|χ] =
ρij and P[aij = 1|aji = 1] = 1, for all χ ∈ χ−ij .
In other words, (i) the probability of a link i1  j1 forming does not depend on whether
i2  j2 forms, unless i1 = i2 and j1 = j2, and (ii) the link i → j exists if and only if j → i also
exists (and hence we write i  j). While the former assumption is made for simplification, we
point out that it captures a broad range of networks seen in practice. For instance, it does not
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rule out highly-clustered networks because some subset of agents may be much more likely to
connect to each other than any other agents. On the other hand, the latter assumption avoids
the possibility of “informational sinks,” whereby an agent is influenced by her environment but
has no influence herself, and therefore social learning has no impact on the evolution of her
beliefs.
We consider two network objects: (i) the realized network G˜, and (ii) the “average” network
G¯. In the realized network G˜, we assume DeGroot agents are influenced equally by all neigh-
bors, so the influence weights satisfy (recall that θi is the weight that agent i places on her own
Bayesian update):
α˜ij =
(1− θi)/di, if aij = 10, otherwise
where di =
∑n
j=1 aij is the realized degree of agent i. If di = 0, then we set α˜ii = 1 − θi and
α˜ij = 0 for all i 6= j. As mentioned in Section 2, Bayesian agents eventually are uninfluenced by
additional social interaction, and instead can be treated as “stubborn agents” under some mild
technical assumptions detailed in Appendix A.3.
On the other hand, in the expected network G¯, expected DeGroot influence weights are given
by:
α¯ij = (1− θi)ρij/d¯i
where d¯i =
∑n
j=1 ρij , which is expected degree of agent i.
7 As before, if d¯i = 0, then we set
α¯ii = 1− θi and α¯ij = 0 for all i 6= j. In both the realized and expected networks, Bayesian agents
can be modeled as agents with θ = 1 and whose signals cannot be jammed by the principal.
3.1 Deterministic Reduction
Consider a sequence of growing societies Sn each with n agents. The main connection we de-
velop in this section is between a growing sequence of random networks G˜n and the correspond-
ing “average” networks given by G¯n. Agent n is born in society Sn with persistent sophistication
type τn ∈ {B,D}.8 Moreover, agent i in society Sn has personal-experience weight θ(n)i ∈ (0, 1),
and for simplicity, we write θ(n) as the vector of θ’s when the population is of size n. Finally, we
make the following assumption:
7Note that α¯ij is not technically the expectation of αij for finite n, but these two expressions are shown to be
consistent as n→∞. Moreover, it is more natural to think of α¯ij as the expected influence than a literal expectation
over αij .
8All of our results hold regardless of what the sequence τn actually is. The types B and D stand for Bayesian and
DeGroot, respectively.
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Assumption 2. Consider the sequence of vectors θ ≡ {θ(n)}∞n=1 along with the expected degree
matrix D¯n and the link probability matrix ρn. These satisfy the following two conditions:
(a) The Laplacian matrix, D¯n − ρn has its second-smallest eigenvalue bounded away from 0;
(b) θ(n) is uniformly bounded away from 1: there exists η < 1 and N such that for all n ≥ N ,
θ(n) ≤ η1 component-wise.
The first condition requires the Laplacian matrix of the realized network not have multiple
zero eigenvalues, as this would imply the network is not connected. The second condition rules
out situations where agents become increasingly more reliant on their own news, to the point of
almost entirely ignoring social influence. Together, these conditions ensure the social learning
dynamics are ergodic and non-vanishing.
Each society Sn comes with its own random network generation process given by:
ρn =

ρ11(n) ρ12(n) . . . ρ1n(n)
ρ21(n) ρ22(n) . . . ρ2n(n)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρn1(n) ρn2(n) . . . ρnn(n)

We denote the adjacency matrix of the (realized) random network as A˜n = {aij}ni,j in society Sn.
It is easy to see that the expected adjacency matrix is given simply by the matrix of link prob-
abilities in society Sn, i.e. A¯n = ρn. Note by Assumption 1, both A˜n and A¯n are symmetric.
There are two regularity assumptions we impose on ρn. These are closely related to the condi-
tions needed in Dasaratha (2019) that we adapt to out setting to account for the two facts that (i)
DeGroot influences are formed using the normalized adjacency matrix instead of the adjacency
matrix itself and, (ii) the mixed-learning environment with both Bayesian and DeGroot agents
complicates the belief dynamics.
Our first condition requires that agents’ degrees grow at a sufficiently fast rate. This is im-
portant because in very sparse networks, individual realizations of links have a significant effect
on centrality (see Example 4 in Appendix B). For example, when the expected degree is bounded
above as n → ∞, then any individual link represents a non-vanishing contribution toward an
agent’s DeGroot centrality. Therefore, the realization of this link will be of crucial importance in
determining the agent’s susceptibility to manipulation.
Definition 1 (Expected Degrees). We say that expected adjacency matrix A¯n satisfies the expected-
degrees condition if limn→∞mini∈Sn d¯
(n)
i / log n =∞.
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In other words, the expected degrees condition requires that as the society Sn grows, all
agents in the society have expected degrees which are uniformly growing with log n, regardless
of the time of their birth.9 Note that this is a stronger condition than just requiring every agent
in the network to have an expected degree that grows strictly faster than log n. The difference
between the two conditions may be subtle, but without the stronger condition, there is a signif-
icant chance that the realized network is susceptible to manipulation, even though the average
network G¯n itself never is. For the interested reader, this difference is illustrated in Example 4
given in Appendix B.
Secondly, the society needs to be somewhat homogeneous in the sense that DeGroot agents
weigh their own experiences roughly in the same proportion to other DeGroots:
Definition 2 (Normal Society). We say that θ satisfies the normal society condition if there exists
a constant ν <∞ such that for all DeGroot agents i, j:
lim sup
n→∞
θ
(n)
i
θ
(n)
j
≤ ν
As a special case, the “normal society” condition is always satisfied when all DeGroots have
the exact same θ. The analysis of manipulation is most interesting in this case because a non-
normal society will typically admit some degree of manipulation. In particular, agents whose
θ
(n)
i decay more quickly compared to other agents will be highly influenced by the experiences of
their peers, and hence more susceptible to indirect influence by the principal. Again, interested
readers can refer to Example 5 in Appendix B to see how, in the absence of the normal society
condition, two networks that occur with equal probabilities can have different properties as n→
0.
Under the above regularity conditions, we get the following reduction to deterministic net-
work analysis:
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the sequence of ρn satisfies the expected-degree
condition, and θ is a normal society. Then, with high probability, the random network G˜n is
impervious (resp. susceptible) if and only if G¯n is impervious (resp. susceptible).
Theorem 1 states that under the conditions above, it suffices to consider G¯n instead of G˜n
when looking at manipulation in the large network limit. This theorem offers a major tech-
nical simplification: we can apply the DeGroot centrality analysis from Mostagir et al. (2019)
9Formally, Definition 1 can be replaced with the “uniformity requirement” that ∃βn such that d(n)i ≥ βn logn for
all i ≤ n with limn→∞ βn =∞.
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as if the expected networks are (with high probability) the randomly-generated networks them-
selves. It also proves that network-imperviousness is a 0-1 property: as the network grows larger,
the probability a random network is impervious converges to either zero or one (e.g., unlike in
Example 4 in Appendix B, where it alternates between zero and one as n increases).
4 Homophily, Inequality, and the Spread of Misinformation
We now apply Theorem 1 to analyze a class of networks known as stochastic block networks. This
is a class of networks that was introduced in Holland et al. (1983) and is the focus of the study
of homophily in Golub and Jackson (2012). In stochastic block networks, agents interact in well-
connected communities, with few links between communities. We differentiate between two
cases of interest. In weakly assortative networks, agents are more likely to be linked to agents
within their community, but when they reach out to agents outside that community, they are
equally likely to connect to agents in any other community. In that sense, homophily has a flat
hierarchy. This model turns out to be rather accurate in describing friendship and communica-
tion patterns, as documented in, e.g. Marsden (1987). We show in Theorem 2 that learning is
sensitive to the amount of homophily in society and that this effect is not monotone. We then
identify special circumstances in Theorem 3 and show that under these circumstances, the role
of homophily resembles the results in the literature, i.e. more homophily impedes learning, but
that this is generally not true when the conditions for the special case do not hold.
Finally, we introduce strongly assortative networks, which are communities ordered by simi-
larity, with agents in neighboring communities more likely to be linked than agents in communi-
ties that are farther apart. This model captures the more hierarchical structure that is sometimes
observed in society. While this is a natural homophily model, we are not aware of any literature
that studies it compared to the much stronger focus on weakly-assortative networks. We com-
pare the effects of weak and strong homophily on the spread of misinformation in Proposition 2.
4.1 Weak Homophily
Consider k “islands” (an equivalence class on all agents) where each island has a proportionate
amount of the population {s1, . . . , sk}with s1 + . . .+sk = 1. The vector m = (m1, ...,mk) denotes
the number of Bayesian agents on each island.10 We assume that if agents i and j are on the
same island, then pij = ps, and if i and j are on different islands, then pij = pd, with ps >
pd. This is the weakly assortative homophily model referred to earlier. The key feature is that
10We use the words “island” and “community” interchangeably.
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within each island, agents are more likely to be connected, but there is no differentiation when
communicating across islands. For simplicity, we will assume throughout that θ(n)i = 1/n for all
DeGroot agents i, so as to isolate the effect of homophily on manipulation.11 The corresponding
mean adjacency matrix for the weak homophily model is given by:
A¯WHn =

ps1ns1×ns1 pd1ns1×ns2 · · · pd1ns1×nsk
pd1ns2×ns1 ps1ns2×ns2 · · · pd1ns2×nsk
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
pd1nsk×ns1 pd1nsk×ns2 · · · ps1nsk×nsk

4.1.1 General Methods
One can easily check that the weak homophily model satisfies all the regularity conditions in
Section 3, and so we can use Theorem 1 and work with deterministic systems. Here, we will in-
troduce the general methodology for determining whether a population (or community) whose
structure is randomly drawn from the weak homophily model is susceptible to manipulation.
We provide an upper bound on the extent of incorrect beliefs (recall that these beliefs are equiv-
alent to DeGroot centralities of the agents) in the population by first assuming the principal
targets all DeGroot agents, which can be generalized to arbitrary principal strategies, albeit
with more complicated formulations. DeGroot centralities can be computed in a similar way
to other centrality measures (e.g., Bonacich centrality), by counting the sum of weighted walks
to Bayesian agents. This is highlighted in Figure 1 and an analytical procedure is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Computing DeGroot centralities is easiest by considering the linear recursive formulation
of weighted walks, as in Figure 2 and noting that, by symmetry, the walks on each island are
identical. Suppose m` is the number of Bayesian agents on island ` and m−` is the number of
Bayesian agents on all other islands besides `. Denote by w` the sum of weighted walks to a
Bayesian for an agent i living on island `. Then,
w`
1− θ(n)i
=
psm` + pdm−`
pss`n+ pd(1− s`)n +
ps(s`n−m`)
pss`n+ pd(1− s`)nw` +
∑
`′ 6=`
pd(s`′n−m`′)
pss`n+ pd(1− s`)nw`
′
11If we let θ(n)i vary with say, the size of agent i’s neighborhood, then we are simultaneously measuring the effects
from changing the homophily structure and the experience weights. An increase in ps, while increasing homophily,
also decreases θ and may decrease manipulation simply by virtue of allowing the Bayesians to communicate more
effectively.
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Figure 1. An illustration of computing weighted walks to Bayesians agents. Solid circles are
DeGroot agents and shaded circles are Bayesians. Solid lines represent higher weights ”within-
community links” than dotted lines. Consider the top-left agent, and for each walk, multiply
the weights of the links along the walk. The figure on the left shows a first-order walk, i.e. a
walk of length 1, which consists of the link directly connecting that agent to a Bayesian agent.
The second-order walk displayed on the right consists of walks of length 2, so that there is a link
to another DeGroot agent who is linked to a Bayesian agent, and the weight of that walk is the
product of the two link weights and so on. Total weighted walks is the sum over all orders (i.e.,
walk lengths) of walks 1, 2, . . ..
In particular, this admits a linear matrix equation with a closed-form solution:
I
(n)
θ w = a+Bw =⇒ w = (I(n)θ −B)−1a (1)
where
I
(n)
θ =

1
1−θ(n)1
0 . . . 0
0 1
1−θ(n)2
. . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1
1−θ(n)k

which implies that 1 − w` for agent i living on island ` is equal to her belief of the false state
when the principal sends fake signals to all agents in the network. Using this calculation, it is
possible to provide sufficiency conditions on the exact parameters (i.e., ps, pd, {m`}k`=1, {s`}k`=1)
so that the network is impervious (by basically showing that the DC of all agents is less than the
threshold 1−b2 ). In general, for tight (i.e. necessary and sufficient) conditions, one must consider
more general principal strategies, as we will demonstrate in later sections.12 The next example
illustrates the methodology described above and serves as an entry point for discussing inequal-
12As an aside: to prove the network is susceptible, it is always sufficient to prove that some strategy obtains positive
profit.
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Figure 2. An analytic approach to computing Bayesian walks for the top-left agent (which equals
her belief of the true state). Each agent’s sum of walks equals a weighted-average of her neigh-
bors’ sums of walks.
ity.
Example 1 (2-Island Model). We consider two islands of equal size and explore the degree of
manipulation under different homophily structures, similar to Figures 1 and 2. In this exam-
ple, we measure inequality by the distribution of Bayesian agents across communities. These
inequalities may exist, for instance, if sophisticated agents are more concentrated in one island
and mostly talk amongst each other.
Suppose that each of the two islands has an equal share of the population, i.e. s1 = s2 = 1/2.
Let there be n = 100 agents, of which 10% are Bayesian and let ps = 0.9 and pd = 0.1, so
there a significant degree of homophily. We consider two distinct cases: (i) The distributions
of Bayesians m is given by m = (5, 5), i.e. the Bayesians are split evenly between the two islands,
and (ii) the Bayesians all reside on the first island, i.e. m = (10, 0). Finally, we consider a mod-
ification of case (ii) where the Bayesians all reside on one island but the homophily structure is
ps = 0.5 and pd = 0.5.
We use Equation (1) to compute the weighted walks. For case (i), we get:
100
99
 w1
w2
 =
 0.1
0.1
+
 0.81 0.09
0.09 0.81
 w1
w2
 =⇒
 w1
w2
 =
 0.9083
0.9083

Therefore, for every DeGroot i, we have that her belief of the false state is only around 0.0917,
and so, for b . 0.816, there is no manipulation for any value of ε (recall that the cutoff belief from
Table 1 is given by (1 − b)/2 = 1−0.8162 = 0.092, so that an agent is manipulated only if her belief
in the false state falls above this cutoff).
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Now for case (ii), assume island 1 has all of the Bayesians, then:
100
99
 w1
w2
 =
 0.18
0.02
+
 0.72 0.1
0.08 0.9
 w1
w2
 =⇒
 w1
w2
 =
 0.9114
0.8438

Notice that the belief (of the false state) of the agents on the first island has decreased to 0.0886,
which implies they cannot be manipulated for this same range of b. On the other hand, for 0.68 <
b < 0.82, agents on the second island can now be manipulated (whenever ε < 1/2). That is,
inequality in Bayesian distribution coupled with the homophily structure leads one community
to hold beliefs that are farther from the truth because this community has less access to Bayesian
agents.
Let us continue with the case of unequal distribution of Bayesians but assume that the ho-
mophily structure comes from an Erdos-Renyi model with ps = pd = 0.5, then:
100
99
 w1
w2
 =
 0.1
0.1
+
 0.4 0.5
0.4 0.5
 w1
w2
 =⇒
 w1
w2
 =
 0.9083
0.9083

which gives the same result as case (i), i.e. society as a whole is impervious because there is
no longer inequality in terms of access to Bayesian agents. Therefore, extreme degrees of ho-
mophily can be seen to increase the inequality of DeGroot centralities (and thus beliefs of the
incorrect state), which in turn decreases the imperviousness of the network.
In summary, when ε is small, homophily exhibits a phase transition whereby increasing ho-
mophily eventually transitions the network from impervious to susceptible. This is largely con-
sistent with the social learning literature that studies homophily and its (negative) impacts on
information aggregation, but as we discuss shortly, this structure is only applicable under special
circumstances.
The aforementioned example highlights how increasing homophily can generate informa-
tional inequalities between groups with different compositions of agent sophistication types.
Importantly, inequality arises as a combination of uneven distribution of Bayesian agents be-
tween communities and a homophily structure that impedes one community from being able to
draw some of their information from those Bayesian agents. The example above can be strength-
ened by performing basic comparative statics on homophily. Towards this end, we parametrize
a random network A˜n by the homophily model (ps, pd,m) from which it is drawn and opera-
tionalize inequality in the following definition.
Definition 3. (Inequality) For two random networks A˜n and A˜′n, we say A˜n exhibits less inequal-
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ity than A˜′n if the following conditions hold:
(a) There is more communication across islands; namely, the between-group link probabilities
satisfy pd ≥ p′d;
(b) There is less communication within islands; namely, the within-group link probabilities sat-
isfy ps ≤ p′s;
(c) The distribution of Bayesian agents across groups is more “equally distributed” for all popu-
lations n; formally, m′/s is a majorization13 of m/s, for all n.14
with at least one condition strict.
If networkAhas less inequality than networkA′, this suggests two features. First, any agent in
networkA is more likely to talk to agents outside her own island, relative to networkA′. Second,
there is less inequality in terms of direct connections to Bayesian agents: any two agents in
network A are more likely to have a similar number of weighted connections to Bayesians as
compared to network A′. The most equitable distribution of Bayesians occurs when Bayesians
are the same constant fraction of the population in every island.
4.1.2 Inequality and Network Homophily
Based on Definition 3, we can decompose inequality into the inequality resulting from network
homophily and inequality resulting from Bayesian placement. To most transparently demon-
strate the effects from homophily, we begin by assuming there is one island consisting of only
Bayesians, whereas all other islands consist of only DeGroots (i.e., m = (ns1,0)). This way in-
equality between two networks can be measured in terms of (un)equal access to Bayesians as a
result of different homophily structures. With this understanding, we present our main result,
which establishes that homophily has an ambiguous effect on learning:
Theorem 2. Assume there exists pd < ps where the network is impervious. Then there exist cutoffs
0 < p
d
< p′d < p¯d < 1 such that:
(i) Whenever pd > p¯d, the network is impervious;
(ii) If there is manipulation when pd < pd, there is manipulation when pd < pd < p
′
d;
13A majorization x′ of x satisfies (i)
∑k
`=1 x` =
∑k
`=1 x
′
` and (ii)
∑`∗
`=1 x` ≥
∑`∗
`=1 x
′
` for all `
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where
the components of x and x′ are sorted in ascending order (see Marshall et al. (2011)).
14An equivalent condition is whether one can transformm′ intom via a sequence of “Robin Hood” operations: one
can recover m from m′ via a sequence of transferring Bayesians from islands with more Bayesians to those islands
with fewer (see Arnold (1987)).
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(iii) There exists some (ε, b) such that the network is impervious when pd < pd, but susceptible
when p
d
< pd < p
′
d.
This result establishes the weak homophily effect. Loosely, Theorem 2 states that an “inter-
mediate” amount of homophily is worse than an extreme amount of homophily, which in turn
is worse than no homophily at all. While removing all inequality improves learning, simply re-
ducing inequality in an extremely homophilous society can actually lead to worse learning and
manipulation. Theorem 2 can be easily generalized to consider other measures of inequality
(i.e., ps and m) as given in Definition 3.
Underlying the previous result is the fact that social connections have both positive and neg-
ative externalities. On one hand, they serve as a transmission mechanism for spreading the
(correct) beliefs of the Bayesian agents. However, they also allow the principal to spread misin-
formation in a less costly way, by only targeting a subset of the agents, and using social forces to
manipulate other agents as well. When homophily is strong, the principal cannot use one com-
munity to influence another, which can make manipulation costly, and ultimately unprofitable.
When homophily is quite weak, all Bayesians work together to spread correct information, de-
spite the presence of any possible misinformation from the principal. Intermediate homophily
often acts as the perfect breeding ground for manipulating beliefs.
This result provides a sleek connection to models of contagion in financial networks (see
Acemoglu et al. (2015), Babus (2016), Kanak (2017)). Similar to the degree of homophily in our
setting, in these models, connections both serve to reduce and exacerbate the propagation of
negative forces. On one hand, when a bank’s related institutions are in distress, the bank finds
itself less well-capitalized and more likely to default. However, when a bank faces an idiosyn-
cratic or temporary problem, it can rely on neighboring institutions to protect it from insolvency.
Hence, the stability of a financial network can be subtle, and the effect of increased interconnec-
tivity is typically ambiguous, just as with social learning in the presence of homophily.
4.1.3 Inequality and Bayesian Placement
Theorem 2 shows that homophily typically has a non-monotone effect on learning. This is gen-
erally inconsistent with the social learning models where news is not provided by a motivated
principal. We next show that the general result from these models (that increased homophily
is bad for learning) can be recovered in a special case of our setup where a) the cost of sending
jammed signals is low and b) the populations of different islands are of the same size (this is the
equal-size islands model from Golub and Jackson (2012)). We then provide two examples that vi-
olate each of these conditions to show that they are necessary to generate the special case result,
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and that in general, the effect of homophily on learning is ambiguous and increased homophily
can still help learning. The following comparative static applies to all forms of inequality (net-
work homophily and Bayesian placement):
Theorem 3. Suppose there are k islands of equal size (s1 = s2 = . . . = sk = 1/k). There exists
ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε < ε¯, if network A˜ is susceptible to manipulation, any network A˜′ with
more inequality is also susceptible to manipulation, with high probability.
If agents increase the likelihood of forming connections outside their own community, this
decreases homophily and reduces the level of manipulation possible, even in communities which
have few Bayesian agents. When investment costs are low, the principal finds it profitable to jam
the signals of all agents if this means he can manipulate even just one. Therefore, it suffices
to consider the DeGroot centrality when the principal targets all agents, and in particular look
at the island with the highest DeGroot centrality, as their beliefs are “farthest” from the truth.
Because decreasing homophily equalizes DeGroot centralities across communities of the same
size, this is necessarily beneficial to the community with the most incorrect beliefs.
As we mentioned, there are important caveats to the effect described above:
Sizable costs: when the costs of influence ε are intermediate or large, sizable investments that
lead to only a small fraction of manipulated individuals are unprofitable, but by decreasing ho-
mophily, these same investments can lead to a much larger manipulated population, thereby
making them profitable (similar to Theorem 2).
Different population sizes: when communities consist of different size populations, beliefs are
sculpted in more complex ways, and it is possible that an increase in homophily can move all
agents’ beliefs closer to the truth.
We demonstrate these two effects via Examples 2 and 3 below, which offer contrary evidence
to the generally-accepted idea that homophily always hurts learning. Lastly, note that while
Theorem 3 states that increased homophily cannot make the network impervious, it does not
rule out that such an increase can still decrease the number of manipulated agents.
Example 2 (Sizable Costs). Consider the following simulated example. Suppose there are two
islands with equal population (n = 100, 50 agents on each island), with two Bayesians on one
island and none on the other. Suppose ε is slightly less than one and b = 1/3 and for simplicity
that ps = pd so there is plenty of communication and the beliefs on both islands are identical. If
the principal exerts effort into sending signals to all agents, their beliefs in the correct state fall
below the cutoff (1 + b)/2 = 2/3 and so all agents are manipulated. This gives the principal a
higher payoff than sending no signals whatsoever, so the network is susceptible. This is shown
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Figure 3. Low Homophily - Agent’s Beliefs and Principal’s Strategy (heavy lines between islands
indicate strong connectivity).
in Figure 3, where the principal sends signals to all agents and beliefs in both populations fall
below the 2/3 threshold (all agents are manipulated).
Now suppose homophily increases, so that ps = 0.8 and pd = 0.2. Once again, consider
the case where the principal sends jammed signals to all of the agents in the network. After
the increase in homophily, the island with two Bayesians moves closer to the truth whereas the
island with no Bayesians moves farther away. All agents in the first island now hold beliefs (of
the true state) which exceed the cutoff of (1 + b)/2, and so are not manipulated (see Figure 4).
Given that ε > 1/2 and only half the population is manipulated, this strategy is not profitable for
the principal and he would prefer to talk no action rather than send jammed signals to the entire
population.
Figure 4. High Homophily - Agents’ beliefs and principal’s strategy. Agents in Community I are
manipulated by the strategy is still not profitable for the principal.
It then remains to check that the principal cannot manipulate the island with no Bayesians
(“Community I” in the figure) while sending fewer signals to the second island (“Community II”),
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Figure 5. High Homophily - Agents’ beliefs and principal’s strategy. There is no profitable strat-
egy that targets only a subset of agents.
as shown in the right part of Figure 5.15 To be cost effective, the principal must almost entirely
stop sending signals to the second island. However, when doing this, the beliefs of the agents in
that island become even closer to the truth, as can be seen in the plot on the left in Figure 5, and
these beliefs are strong enough such that they seep through to the first island despite the weak
ties, making the principal unable to manipulate agents on that island as well and leading to the
entire society becoming impervious.
Example 3 (Different Population Sizes). We consider one large island (more sophisticated) and
one small island (less sophisticated), as pictured in Figure 6. We illustrate how it is possible for
decreases in homophily to make the network more susceptible, even when ε is small.
Consider one large island with 80 agents (five of whom are Bayesians) and a small island with
20 agents (only one of whom is Bayesian). Notice that the fraction of Bayesians on the first island
is 6.25% whereas it is only 5% on the smaller island. Suppose we originally start with the case of
no homophily; that is, let ps = pd = 0.5. Then we can see that:
100
99
 w1
w2
 =
 0.06
0.06
+
 0.75 0.19
0.75 0.19
 w1
w2
 =⇒
 w1
w2
 =
 0.8559
0.8559

As expected, the beliefs on the two islands are the same. Now let us increase homophily by
setting ps = 0.8 and pd = 0.2, in which case:
100
99
 w1
w2
 =
 0.0618
0.0562
+
 0.8824 0.0559
0.4687 0.4750
 w1
w2
 =⇒
 w1
w2
 =
 0.8584
0.8571

15It can be shown with equal island sizes that the principal does not prefer to stop sending some signals to the
second island.
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(a) Low Homophily. (b) High Homophily.
Figure 6. Example 3: Homophily can be beneficial when island sizes are unequal.
which shows that the beliefs of both islands moved closer to the truth after introducing ho-
mophily.16
If there is a concentration of Bayesian agents on the large island, decreasing homophily leads
to increasing within-group links. This allows the DeGroot agents on the large island to commu-
nicate more with their fellow Bayesians, which strengthens the beliefs of agents on that island
about the true state. However, because of the size imbalance between the islands, the small is-
land still has plenty of connections to agents in the large island. In the matrix above B21, the
amount island 2 draws from island 1’s belief, is still substantial as compared to B22, the amount
island 2 draws from its own island (whereas on island 1 B11 is much larger than B12). Therefore,
the second island still draws much of its opinions from those agents on island 1, which in turn
moves the beliefs in its community closer to the truth. In this example, increased homophily
leads all islands to move their beliefs closer to truth. One can show that the exact opposite hap-
pens when most Bayesian agents reside on the small island: increasing homophily leads both
communities (including the small one) to move further away from the truth (since agents on
that island still absorb the misinformation persistent on the larger island), thereby making ma-
nipulation easier in both communities.
As a final interesting point, we note that the beliefs of an agent on island ` do not necessarily
move closer to the truth when a Bayesian agent is moved from some other island to `. Thus,
decreasing inequality can lead to a Pareto-improvement in the (correct) beliefs of all agents in
society. This occurs because of the decreasing marginal benefit from adding Bayesians to a given
island. This is because of the following opposing forces: moving a Bayesian to an island (call it
island 1) provides a direct influence towards truth on that island. At the same time, the island
from which that Bayesian was removed (island 2) is now more prone to misinformation, and
this misinformation propagates back and impacts the beliefs of agents in island 1. For instance,
16Note that while this difference is small, for different values of θ, the effect can be much more exaggerated. We
emphasize the directional change as opposed to its magnitude for this reason.
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Figure 7. An illustration of Proposition 1: under weak homophily, a constant number of Bayesian
agents is enough to prevent manipulation anywhere in the network.
with two communities of equal size, if there are 10 Bayesian agents, the beliefs of agents in both
communities are closer to the truth when there are 8 Bayesians on island 1 and 2 Bayesians on
island 2 as compared to 9 Bayesians on island 1 and a single Bayesian on island 2. So even
though agents in island 1 talk directly to more Bayesians when there are 9 of them, the more
misinformed beliefs of island 2 make the entire population worse off.
We conclude this section by giving a lower bound on the number of Bayesian agents needed
to achieve imperviousness, regardless of the position of these agents or the homophily structure
of the network.
Proposition 1. Fix (ps, pd) and (ε, b). There exists c > 1 such that as n→∞, if there arem = Ω((c−
ps + pd)
−1) Bayesian agents anywhere, then any weak homophily network A˜n with communities
{s`}k`=1 is impervious with high probability. In particular, if the number of Bayesian agents grows
unboundedly with n, any weak homophily network is impervious with high probability.
In summary, in the weakly-assortative model, agents are more likely to form connections
within their own community, but all connections outside of the community are equally likely.
For general weak homophily networks, the bound on the number of Bayesians needed for im-
perviousness does best when there is little homophily. This reinforces the result of Theorem 3
and applies even if the communities are of unequal sizes.
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4.2 Strong Homophily
Suppose now we introduce a different model of homophily: the strongly-assortative model. Most
studies of homophily in the literature is of the stochastic block weak homophily type; for exam-
ple, the equal-size islands model in Golub and Jackson (2012). Strong homophily is a novel twist
on stochastic block networks that provide an apt representation of a society where connections
are formed in a hierarchical fashion. The effects of strongly-assortative homophily drastically
contrast with the weakly-assortative case studied in the previous section. We assume that each
island j has a vector of qualities, Λj ∈ RL. Qualities can capture different variables like educa-
tion, profession, income, etc. Islands can be sorted according to their similarity to other islands,
with the distance metric between islands i and j given by d(i, j) = ||Λi − Λj ||2. For simplicity,
we assume that L = 1 (the quality vector is one-dimensional) and link probabilities are given as
follows: within-community links are still formed according to probability ps, similar to the weak
homophily model. On the other hand, communities are (strongly) ordered by their Λj on a line
topology. In our model, agents in community i are linked to agents in community i + 1 or i − 1
with probability pd, whereas agents in “farther” communities are linked with probability 0.17 The
corresponding mean adjacency matrix for the strong homophily model is given by:
A¯SHn =

ps1ns1×ns1 pd1ns1×ns2 0ns1×ns3 · · · 0ns1×nsk
pd1ns2×ns1 ps1ns2×ns2 pd1ns2×ns3 · · · 0ns2×nsk
0ns3×ns1 pd1ns3×ns2 ps1ns3×ns3 · · · 0ns3×nsk
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0nsk×ns1 0nsk×ns2 0nsk×ns3 · · · ps1nsk×nsk

For illustration, we assume that one community has mn Bayesian agents and all other com-
munities consist of DeGroot agents. We assume that mn is any superconstant for the following
result:
Proposition 2. Fix (ps, pd). There exists (ε, b) such that for every large n, there is a strongly assor-
tative homophily network A˜n with communities {s`}k`=1 susceptible to manipulation with high
probability (as n→∞). On the other hand, the weak homophily network with the same commu-
nities {s`}k`=1 is impervious with high probability.
Proposition 2 shows the stark difference between weak and strong homophily. Furthermore,
we note that a significant proportion of the agents are manipulated in the presence of strongly-
17We can equivalently assume that these link probabilities are positive but decay sufficiently quickly, such as on
the order of exp(−||Λi − Λj ||2). For simplicity of exposition and illustration of the effects of our strong assortative
property, we simply set the link probabilities to 0.
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Figure 8. An illustration of Proposition 2: even with many Bayesian agents, strong homophily
allows the principal to manipulate many agents in the network. In the figure above, Community
IV believes the false state without even being directly exposed to fake news from the principal.
assortative links. The proof of Proposition 2 shows how the principal has a strategy that can
manipulate all but O(
√
n) agents under this line topology (see Appendix C). Moreover, we note
that increasing strong homophily (by either increasing ps or decreasing pd) exacerbates the ex-
tent of manipulation. We provide an intuition in what follows.
Because links are undirected in the strong homophily network, agents receiving fake news
communicate their experiences both forwards and backwards, which leads to an overall more
effective propagation of incorrect beliefs. When communication goes both ways, agents believe
the state that is more “local” to their position in the line. This is largely due to an echo chamber
effect, where the influence from misinformation, as reflected in the agents’ beliefs, gets inflated
because they fail to recognize their own influence on their neighbors’ beliefs. While this echo
chamber aids the principal in manipulating more agents, it also makes it more difficult to ma-
nipulate agents at the end of the line. In particular, the principal must continue to send fake
signals for all but the last O(
√
n) agents. This again is for the same reason as before: if the prin-
cipal fails to send fake signals to too many communities at the end of the line, their beliefs will
reflect mostly the organic news they receive.
Nonetheless, the deep separation between the Bayesians and some DeGroots in the strongly-
assortative model creates pervasive manipulation not present in weak homophily, where strong
connections within communities and weaker ones between communities do not necessarily
lead to manipulation in the large limit. On the other hand, when agents within a certain com-
munity are more likely to interact with agents in other communities of a particular kind, then
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some manipulation will generally be unavoidable.
5 Optimal Interventions
We now discuss the role that a social planner has in shaping the beliefs of society in the presence
of the principal. We consider two possible interventions: Bayesian interventions and homophily
interventions. In the former, we assume the planner may improve the sophistication type of a
subset of agents, perhaps through targeted education. In the latter, the planner may decrease
the extent of homophily through efforts to integrate communities (i.e. by increasing pd). We
focus on two types of policies:
(a) Preventative policy: Ideally, a planner would like to make the network impervious, so that
there is no manipulation at all. A policy is preventative if it accomplishes such a goal. Having
as many Bayesian agents as given in the bound of Proposition 1 would yield such a policy.
Sometimes however, preventative policies may not exist because of budget constraints,18
which leads to the second type of policy we consider.
(b) Protective policy: This policy aims to protect as many agents as possible by minimizing the
number manipulated. Recall from Equation (1) that we can write the beliefs of the agents,
pi, as:
pi(m) = (I
(n)
θ −B(m))−1a
where B(m) is a linear function of the distribution m of Bayesians across islands. Then the
planner solves min
∑n
i=1 1pii<(1+b)/2, i.e. minimize the number of agents whose beliefs fall
below the manipulation cutoff.
If the optimal solution to the minimization problem above is zero, then the protective and
preventative policies coincide. In general however, a preventative policy –if it exists– is the
unique Pareto-optimal outcome for society, whereas optimal protective policies may be forced
to benefit some agents over others. We derive the optimal policies for some special cases, but
show through simulated examples that inequality can often be beneficial to society.
5.1 Bayesian Interventions
While up until now we have considered an agent’s sophistication type as immutable, we consider
the possibility of endowing some agents in the population with Bayesian abilities. Equivalently,
18It is possible that there is no preventative policy even with unlimited budget, as we discuss in Section 5.2
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since Bayesian agents are stubborn agents who hold correct beliefs, one can think of providing
an agent with verifiable information about the state (e.g. through teaching a class or program).
We assume that this process is costly and that the planner’s budget constraint is of the form∑n
i=1 1τi=B ≤ M for some integer number of Bayesians M . Based on our observations in Theo-
rem 3 we note:
Proposition 3. The preventative policy when ε is sufficiently small is to set m` = M · s` for all
islands ` (i.e., distribute the Bayesians equally).
In other words, when sending jammed signals is cheap for the principal, the planner is best-
off distributing the M Bayesian agents proportionally to the population on each island. If such
placement does not lead to imperviousness, then no preventative policy exists, and the planner
should focus on protective policies instead. As a special case, when all islands are exactly the
same size and a preventative policy exists, then that policy places the same number of Bayesian
agents on each island.
As the cost of sending jammed signals increases, i.e. ε  0, the preventative policy might
require an unequal placement of Bayesians across islands – similar to what we have observed
in Example 2. Therefore, while Proposition 3 states that equal placement of Bayesian agents is
optimal when  is small, for general ε, inequality can be first-best for all agents in society, as we
show next.
To demonstrate Proposition 3 and the above discussion, consider Figure 9, where ε ranges
from small to large on two islands of size 50 each and a budget that is large enough for four
Bayesians (in this example, the homophily structure is ps = 0.8 and pd = 0.2). As ε ranges
from 0 to 0.5 (small ε region), there is no distribution of Bayesians that admits imperviousness.
Proposition 3 allows us to quickly check this by distributing the Bayesians evenly across the two
islands and checking if manipulation exists, which it does since the principal has a profitable
strategy that sends jammed signals to all agents. As ε becomes slightly higher than 0.5, the most
inequitable distribution (4 Bayesians on one island and 0 on the other) or the most equitable
distribution (m1,m2) = (2, 2) lead to manipulation, even when only some of the agents are
targeted by the principal. On the other hand, an unequal distribution of (m1,m2) = (3, 1) or
(m1,m2) = (1, 3) leads to imperviousness. When ε continues to increase, only the even distri-
bution (m1,m2) = (2, 2) makes society susceptible, i.e., (0, 4) and (4, 0) are also impervious, and
splitting the Bayesians equally across both islands is the worst distribution for society. Of course,
eventually, all distributions are impervious when the cost becomes too prohibitive for the prin-
cipal to have a profitable strategy. In summary, for the planner, the most equitable distribution
(m1,m2) = (2, 2) is weakly dominated by (m1,m2) = (3, 1) over the entire cost range of ε.
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Figure 9. Preventative Policies for Bayesian Placement.
It is also straightforward to see that optimal protective policies might necessitate an uneven
number of Bayesians across the islands. If there are two islands, enforcing an equitable distribu-
tion might lead to both islands being manipulated, whereas placing all of the Bayesians on one
island would protect at least all the agents on this island.
5.2 Homophily Interventions
We now consider a fixed homophily model with parameters (ps, pod) and Bayesian distribution
m. We assume the social planner pays a positive, convex cost φ(pd−pod) with φ(0) = 0 to increase
(or decrease) connections between islands. As before, we assume the planner has a budget to
spend; that is, the planner must satisfy φ(pd − pod) ≤ Budget. Based on our observations in
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 we have:
Proposition 4. If Bayesians are distributed equally, then pd = pod is the optimal protective policy.
On the other hand, if the budget is large and either: (i) each island is all Bayesian or all DeGroot
or (ii) all islands are equal sizes and ε is small, then pd = ps is the optimal protective policy.
When Bayesians are distributed equally (i.e., proportionate to the population), the beliefs of
all agents in society are the same regardless of the homophily parameters. Therefore, no inter-
vention is necessary. When all of the Bayesians and DeGroots are segregated (or the islands are
equally-sized), but the planner’s budget is limited, implementing pd = ps may not be feasible.
But most importantly, when there is some inequality in the distribution of Bayesians, some de-
gree of homophily may actually be desirable, even with a large budget. In Example 2, homophily
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Figure 10. Optimal (Simulated) pd with ε = 0.
pushes the community with more Bayesians closer to the truth and makes manipulation un-
profitable; in Example 3, homophily can move all islands closer to the truth. In other words, a
homophilous network can balance out the inequality in the Bayesian distribution.
Unlike with Bayesian interventions, the planner may not want to use the entire budget be-
cause pd may have an interior global optimum. In fact, it is possible the planner may even want
to use the budget to decrease pd, i.e increase homophily. Setting pod = ps and given a big enough
budget, we see this to be true in Figure 10. Moreover, the optimal pd is not always ps when the
island sizes are different and possess an inequitable distribution of Bayesian agents. When ε is
large, as with Bayesian interventions, homophily can be beneficial even when the island sizes
are identical.
To summarize, while sometimes the optimal policies that prevent or minimize the spread of
misinformation take the familiar and expected form of equally distributing resources in propor-
tion to community sizes and of encouraging the integration of communities, it is also possible
that these policies may sometimes necessitate an unequal distribution of resources/Bayesian
agents or require weakening the ties between individual communities.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of homophily in social learning when information may be provided
to the agents by a strategic actor. This setup resembles many realistic scenarios where an infor-
mation provider may have their own agenda and exerts effort to influence agents to follow that
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agenda. We show that in these environments increased homophily can sometimes be beneficial
to society in terms of learning the correct state of the world, which is a novel finding that stands
in contrast to most of the literature. We also show how a special case of our model recovers the
standard results about the negative effects of homophily on learning.
Our main technical result, which reduces the study of stochastic networks into the study of
an average ‘deterministic’ network allows us to capture the best of both worlds: on one hand
we have a model rooted in random network theory and stochastic block matrices, which offers
a more realistic description of real-world networks and allows us to study a phenomenon like
homophily, but on the other hand we can develop insights and policy recommendations that
apply to all networks from this class through studying a much simpler topology.
The finding that homophily can help learning in the presence of strategic injection of news
into society manifests in ways that are not immediately obvious. Because Bayesian agents know
the truth and can help spread it around to their neighbors, then one would imagine that easier
access to these agents would always help society as a whole, but as demonstrated in Theorem 2,
Examples 2 and 3, and Section 5, this is not always the case. By integrating communities, it
is possible that the incorrect beliefs of one community dilute the influence of Bayesian agents
within their own community and lead to an overall failure of learning for all communities. On
the other hand, less integration can result in an increase in costs for injecting misinformation
that results in the principal having no profitable manipulation strategy. Another contribution of
our paper is the introduction of the strong homophily model, which captures another realistic
aspect of social connections –the hierarchical structure that is sometimes present in society–
and contrasting the effect of this model with the standard weak homophily model.
Finally, and as we mention in the introduction, homophily is associated with different nega-
tive social, educational, and economic outcomes, and hence policies that aim to integrate com-
munities in order to alleviate these outcomes are usually desired. The fact that homophily has an
ambiguous effect on learning highlights that one should be careful when designing these poli-
cies, and one takeaway from our paper is that reducing homophily should be approached as a
multi-criteria optimization problem, because of the simple fact that less homophily and more
integration do not necessarily imply an automatic improvement along all metrics of interest, as
we demonstrated in this paper in the case of social learning.
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Appendix
A Technical Conditions and Model Details
Appendix A.1 provides more technical details about the deterministic model, while Appendices
A.2 and A.3 give conditions under which the Bayesian learning results hold in the random net-
work generation model.
A.1 News Generation and Belief Evolution
The following model details are from Mostagir et al. (2019) and are presented here for contextu-
alization of Section 2.
(a) Organic News: We assume agents receive organic information about the state y over time.
News is generated according to a Poisson process with unknown parameter λi > 0 for each
agent i; for simplicity, assume λi has atomless support over (λi,∞) and λ > 0. Let us denote
by (t(1i), t
(i)
2 , . . .) the times at which news occurs for agent i. For all τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, the organic
news for agent i generates a signal s
t
(i)
τ
∈ {S,R} according to the distribution:
P
(
s
t
(i)
τ
= S
∣∣∣y = S) = P(s
t
(i)
τ
= R
∣∣∣y = R) = pi ∈ [1/2, 1)
i.e., the signal is correlated with the underlying truth.
(b) News from Principal: In addition to the organic news process, there is a principal who may
also generate news of his own. At t = 0, the principal picks an influence state yˆ ∈ {R,S}. The
principal then picks an influence strategy xi ∈ {0, 1} for each agent i in the network. If the
principal chooses xi = 1, for any agent i, then he (the principal) generates news according
to an independent Poisson process with (possibly strategically chosen) intensity λ∗i which is
received by all agents where xi = 1. We assume the principal commits to sending signals at
this intensity, which may not exceed some threshold λ¯.
(c) News Observations: Agents are unable to distinguish news sent by the principal or that or-
ganically generated. We denote by tˆ(i)1 , tˆ
(i)
2 , . . . the arrival of all news, either from organic
sources or from the principal, for agent i. At each time tˆ(i)τ , if the news is organic, the agent
gets a signal according to the above distribution, whereas if the news is sent from the princi-
pal, she gets a signal of yˆ.
(d) DeGroot Update: DeGroots use a simple learning heuristic to update beliefs about the un-
derlying state from other agents. We assume every DeGroot agent believes signals arrive ac-
cording to a Poisson process and all signals are independent over time with P
(
si,tˆτ = y
)
= pi
(i.e., takes the news at face value). DeGroot agents form their opinions about the state both
through their own experience (i.e., the signals they receive). Given historyhi,t = (si,tˆ(i)1
, s
i,tˆ
(i)
2
, . . . , s
i,tˆ
(i)
τi
)
up until time t with τi = max{τ : tˆ(i)τ ≤ t}, each agent forms a personal belief about the state
according to Bayes’ rule. Let zSi,t and z
R
i,t denote the number of S and R signals, respectively,
that agent i received by time t; then the DeGroot agent has a direct “personal experience”
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(note that the gi,t function is the mathematical representation of BU(si,t) from Section 2):
gi,t(S|hi,t) = p
zSi,t
i (1− pi)z
R
i,tq
p
zSi,t
i (1− pi)z
R
i,tq + p
zRi,t
i (1− pi)z
S
i,t(1− q)
As mentioned in Section 2, each DeGroot i then updates her belief for all k∆ < t ≤ (k + 1)∆
according to:
pii,t = θigi,t(hi,t) +
n∑
i=1
αijpij,k∆
for some weights θi, αij with θi +
∑n
j=1 αij = 1, and ∆ is a time period of short length.
(e) Bayesian Update: Bayesian agents know the network G and the signal structures {pi}ni=1.
Each Bayesian observes the history of beliefs in her neighborhood Ni for all time t′ ≤ t.
Moreover, the Bayesian is aware the principal may be strategic and has accurate conjectures
about the equilibrium (influence) strategy of the principal. At time t+dt, the Bayesian agents
makes a Bayesian update about the state given her private history of signals and her history
of observed neighbor beliefs, forming pit+dt.
(f ) DeGroot Centrality Vector: To figure out the limit beliefs of the DeGroot agents when the
principal targets everyone who is not a Bayesian, denote by γ the vector in {0, 1}n that des-
ignates which agents are targeted by the principal and let γi = xi = 1 wherever agent i is
DeGroot and γi = xi = 0 everywhere else. DeGroot Centrality, which is equivalent to the
belief in the incorrect state in the limit is then given by D(γ) = (I − A)−1γ = ∑∞k=0Akγ,
where I is the identity and A is the adjacency matrix. DeGroot agent i is manipulated if her
belief in the false state is below the cutoff, i.e. ifDi(γ) < (1− b)/2.
A.2 Conditions for Bayesian Learning
We assume throughout this paper that Bayesian agents are stubborn agents who hold correct
beliefs about the truth (which is Theorem 1 from Mostagir et al. (2019)). In this section, we
provide formal conditions for this to follow when Bayesians in fact must learn the state.
Let B be the set of Bayesian agents and D the set of DeGroot agents. Every network consists
of (i) a neighborhood for each Bayesian agent i, Ni ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, and (ii) an influence vector
for each DeGroot agent i, [A]i = (αi1, · · ·αin). In the realized network G˜, the neighborhood of
each Bayesian agent is given simply by her realized connections, N˜i = {j|aij = 1}; we assume
DeGroot agents are influenced equally by all neighbors, so the influence weights satisfy:
α˜ij =
{
(1− θi)/di, if aij = 1
0, otherwise
where di =
∑n
j=1 aij is the degree of agent i. If di = 0, then we set α˜ii = 1− θi (as before).
Each expected network, G¯, is parametrized by a set of neighborhoods for each Bayesian
agent {N¯i}i∈B , which denote the “expected” neighborhoods of the Bayesians, and are taken as
given. On the other hand, DeGroot influence weights are given by:
α¯ij = (1− θi)ρij/d¯i
where d¯i =
∑n
j=1 ρij , which is expected degree of agent i, the same as before.
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A.3 Reduction to Stubborn Agents
Consider a sequence of growing societies Sn each with n agents. Agent n is born in society Sn
with sophistication type τn ∈ {B,D}, signal intensity λn ∈ R+, and signal strength pn ∈ (1/2, 1),
which never changes. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Consider the vectors λn ≡ {λi}ni=1,pn ≡ {pi}ni=1, and the sequence of vectors
θ ≡ {θ(n)}∞n=1. Then, pn,λn satisfy Assumption 2 from Mostagir et al. (2019) for all n.
Recall that our average network consists of a set of “average” neighborhoods {N¯i}i∈B for the
Bayesians. For example, in the context of Example 4(a), agent 1 forms a link with agent n with
probability 1/2. But in the average network, should we expect agent n to be included in the
neighborhood of Bayesian agent 1? Because this question is difficult to answer, we instead take
the approach that, for the most part, the answer does not matter. For this, we make the additional
assumption:
Definition 4. The average Bayesian network G¯Bn consists of all agents j who are connected to
some Bayesian agent i, and all links between these agents that exist in G¯.
Assumption 4. The directed network of Bayesian agents G¯Bn is connected and contains at least
one DeGroot agent. Moreover, the weights αij between any two agents i, j in the realized net-
work is perturbed by some random ij from a continuous distribution over finite support F (·),
with limn→∞ ij
a.s.→ 0 for all agents i, j (i.e., F (·) converges to δ(0).
The first condition requires the “average” neighborhoods force the Bayesian agents to be
connected to the society of DeGroots. This is a fairly tame condition; for instance, as long as ev-
ery Bayesian observes one DeGroot the condition is satisfied. The second condition, while more
stringent, considers small perturbations to the network weights to guarantee genericity. With-
out it, there are some special cases where a Bayesian agent might have an identification problem
when observing the beliefs of her neighbors. Under both of these assumptions, Bayesian agents
may be treated as stubborn agents as the learning horizon T →∞.
B Random Network Theory Failure Examples
In this section, we provide examples to show that the (Expected Degrees and Normal Society)
conditions required for Theorem 1 cannot be dispensed with.
B.1 Non-Uniform (Slow) Degree Growth
Example 4. Suppose the society Sn has the link probability matrix:
ρn =

0 1 · · · 1 1/2
1 0 · · · 1 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 1 · · · 0 1
1/2 0 · · · 1 0

with θ(n)i = 1/2, so each agent weighs her own experience equally with that of all other neigh-
bors. We assume every third agent is Bayesian. The expected network grows as society grows
according to Figure 11.
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Figure 11. The expected network (solid links = weight 1, dashed lines = weight 1/2).
It can be shown via a walk-counting argument that the DeGroot centrality of all DeGroot
agents 2 ≤ i ≤ (n− 1) is at most approximately 2/3 for large n. Similarly, for DeGroot agent n (in
average network (a)), her centrality is equal to at most (approximately) 13/18 > 2/3. Therefore,
the average network is impervious to manipulation for all b < −4/9 for any ε.
On the other hand, consider the realized network for society Sn. In this case, G˜n looks like
one of the two networks in Figure 12, each with equal probability. For large n the DeGroot cen-
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n
(a) Impervious
12
3
n− 1
n
(b) Susceptible
Figure 12. The realized network (all links are the same).
tralities of all agents 2 ≤ i ≤ (n − 1) are approximately unchanged from the average network.
In network (a), the maximal DeGroot centrality of agent n is strictly less than in the average
network; in particular, it is equal to 2/3, the same as all other DeGroots in the network. Thus,
network (a) is impervious to manipulation for all b < −1/3, which implies that if b < −4/9, then
realized network (a), G˜n, is impervious as in the average network G¯n. In network (b), the maxi-
mal DeGroot centrality of agent n is strictly more than in the average network; in particular, it is
equal to 5/6. For b = −5/9 < −4/9 and sufficiently small ε, agent n will be manipulated under
realized network (b). Therefore, G˜n in network (b) is susceptible to manipulation even though
G¯n is not.
Of course, for any agent i, as n→∞, the expected degree of agent i grows faster than log n (it
grows linearly!), but every third society Sn is susceptible to manipulation with probability 1/2,
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even though the average network G¯n never is.
B.2 Non-Normal Society
(a) Susceptible. (b) Impervious.
Figure 13. Example that non-normal society may violate the random network theory: two net-
works which occur with equal probabilities, but possess different properties as n→∞.
Example 5. For ease of notation, let us define n∗ = n− log2(n). Suppose the first log2(n) agents
are Bayesian, the next two agents are DeGroot with θ = 1/n∗ (who we will call semi-stubborn),
and the remaining agents are DeGroot with θ = 1/ exp(n∗).19 All of the DeGroots are pairwise
adjacent with probability 1 in a clique of size |D|; all of the Bayesians are pairwise adjacent with
probability 1 in a clique of size |B|. Suppose the first semi-stubborn DeGroot agent is adjacent
to the first Bayesian with probability 1 (so the network is always connected), whereas the second
semi-stubborn agent is adjacent to the first Bayesian with only probability 1/2 (called the critical
DeGroot). All other (non semi-stubborn) DeGroot agents are never adjacent to a Bayesian.
When critical DeGroot is adjacent to the Bayesian, the walks to the Bayesian are given by:
w =
2
n∗
wss +
n∗ − 2
n∗
w
wss =
n∗ − 1
n2∗
+
(n∗ − 2)(n∗ − 1)
n2∗
w
which as n→∞ (so n∗ →∞) satisfiesw = wss = 1/3. Now, consider the case where the DeGroot
is not adjacent to the Bayesian; the walks to the Bayesians are given by:
w =
1
n∗
wc +
1
n∗
wss +
n∗ − 2
n∗
w
wss =
n∗ − 1
n2∗
+
(n∗ − 1)(n∗ − 2)
n2∗
w +
n∗ − 1
n2∗
wc
wc =
n∗ − 2
n∗
w +
1
n∗
wss
which as n → ∞ satisfies w = wss = wc = 0. When (1 + b)/2 = 1/3, b = −1/3, whereas
when (1 + b)/2 = 0, b = −1. Thus, for b ∈ (−1,−1/3) (and ε ≈ 0), the network is impervious
19Note, that technically this violates the principle that τ : N → {B,D} is a fixed map. However, it is a basic fact
that there exists a fixed map τ such that for any n, the number of Bayesians is approximately log2(n); for simplicity,
we omit this detail.
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with probability 1/2 (if the critical agent is adjacent to a Bayesian) and susceptible with prob-
ability 1/2 (if the critical agent is not adjacent to the Bayesian). But clearly the normal society
condition is violated since the semi-stubborn agents hold θ = 1/n∗ and other DeGroots hold
θ = 1/ exp(n∗), and limn→∞(1/n∗)/(1/ exp(n∗)) = ∞. The average network G¯ is impervious if
and only if b ∈ (−1,−2/3).
Note that if θ = 1/n∗ for all DeGroot agents, then w = wss = wc = 0 regardless of the
realization of this link; on the other hand, if θ = 1/ exp(n∗), then w = wss = wc = 1 regardless of
the realization of this link.
C Proofs
Preliminaries The following notation is used throughout the proofs. The vector γ ∈ {0, 1}n
denotes which agents are targeted by the principal, and the DeGroot Centrality vector resulting
from this targeting is denoted byD(γ). DeGroot agent i is manipulated ifDi(γ) < (1− b)/2.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us denote by E˜n the “expected” (normalized) adjacency matrix, E˜n =
E[ρ˜n]E[D˜n]−1, and the “mean” influence network, A¯n = O
(n)
θ E˜n, where:
O
(n)
θ =

(1− θ(n)1 ) 0 . . . 0
0 (1− θ(n)2 ) . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . (1− θ(n)n )

The first step of the proof establishes that the difference between the “mean” (normalized) adja-
cency matrix and the realized (normalized) adjacency matrix, ||ρ˜nD˜−1n − E¯n||2, is small with high
probability. In the second step, we prove that for any sequence of slack parameters γn, the differ-
ence between the expected and realized DeGroot centrality vector, ||D(γn)− E[D(γn)]||2, is also
small with high probability.20 Finally, we argue that this proves that An is with high probability
impervious (resp. susceptible) if and only if A¯n is impervious (resp. susceptible).
Step 1: Call E˜n ≡ ρ˜nD˜−1n . Let ψ > 0. Let d(n) = mini d(n)i ; that is, d(n) is the expected min-
imum degree. We first show that the Laplacian matrices L˜n = I − D˜−1/2n ρ˜nD˜−1/2n and L¯n =
I − D¯−1/2n ρ¯nD¯−1/2n satisfy limn→∞ P[||L˜n − L¯n||2 ≥ ψ] = 0 (i.e., they are equal with high prob-
ability). It follows from Theorem 2 in Chung and Radcliffe (2011) that with probability at least
1− ψ:
||L˜n − L¯n||2 ≤ 2
√
3 log(4n/ψ)
d(n)
By the expected-degrees condition, we know that limn→∞ d(n)/ log n→∞, which implies that:
lim sup
n→∞
||L˜n − L¯n||2 ≤ lim
n→∞ 2
√
3 log(4n/ψ)
d(n)
= 0
20From Appendix A.1, the DeGroot Centrality Vector is given by D(γ) = (I − A)−1γ = ∑∞k=0Akγ, where γ is the
vector in {0, 1}n with γi = 1 if Agent i is targeted by the principal, I is the identity and A is the adjacency matrix.
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establishing the desired result. It is clear that the same implication is true of the matrices:
N˜ ≡ D˜−1/2n ρ˜nD˜−1/2n = D˜−1/2n E˜nD˜1/2
N¯ ≡ D¯−1/2n ρ¯nD¯−1/2n = D¯−1/2E¯nD¯1/2
Thus, let us write:
lim sup
n→∞
||E˜n − E¯n||2 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
||D˜1/2N˜D˜−1/2 − D¯1/2N¯D¯−1/2||2
≤ lim sup
n→∞
(
max{||D˜1/2||2, ||D¯1/2||2}
)
||N˜− N¯||2
(
max{||D˜−1/2||2, ||D¯−1/2||2}
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
ψ ·
(
max{||D˜1/2||2, ||D¯1/2||2}
)
·
(
max{||D˜−1/2||2, ||D¯−1/2||2}
)
Let Lij be the binary random variable for if there exists a link j → i, note that:
||D˜1/2n ||2||D¯−1/2n ||2 =
√
maxi
∑n
j=1 Lij
maxi
∑n
j=1 pij
≤ max
i
√∑n
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
||D˜1/2n ||2||D¯−1/2n ||2 =
√
maxi
∑n
j=1 pij
maxi
∑n
j=1 Lij
≤ max
i
√∑n
j=1 pij∑n
j=1 Lij
which are both bounded above almost surely. To see this, note that for n large, we can apply the
Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem (see Billingsley (1995)):
lim
n→∞
∑
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
− 1 ∼ 1∑n
j=1 pij
N
0, n∑
j=1
pij(1− pij)

∼ 1√
log n
N (0,Ωn)
where Ωn → 0. If z1, . . . , zn are normally distributed with variance σ2, then by the Fisher-Tippet-
Gnedenko theorem (see Charras-Garrido and Lezaud (2013) and Taylor (2011)), we see that:
E
[
max
i
zi
]
∈ O(σ
√
log n)
Therefore, we have by Jensen’s inequality:
E
[
max
i
√∑n
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
]
= E
[√
max
i
∑n
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
]
≤
√√√√E[max
i
∑n
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
]
∈ 1 +O(
√
Ωn)
n→∞→ 1
which by Markov’s inequality suggests for any κ > 0:
lim
n→∞P
[
max
i
√∑n
j=1 Lij∑n
j=1 pij
≤ (1 + κ)
]
= 1
38
Similar reasoning proves the second case where maxi D˜n < maxi D¯n. This establishes that ||E˜n−
E¯n||2 is small with high probability.
Step 2: In this step, we model Bayesian agents i by taking θ(n)i = 1 for all n. We note then that
A˜n = O
(n)
θ E˜n and A¯n = O
(n)
θ E¯n. Fix a sequence of influence vectors, γn. For every ψ > 0, we can
write for large enough n:∣∣∣∣∣∣(I− A˜n)−1 − (I− A¯n)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∞∑
k=0
(
A˜kn − A¯kn
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∞∑
k=0
Okn(E˜
k
n − E¯kn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣Okn∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣E˜kn − E¯kn∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∞∑
k=0
(
1− inf
i
θ
(n)
i
)k
ψ
≤ ψ
infi θ
(n)
i
Note that this implies for large n any γn:(
(I− A˜n)−1 − (I− A¯n)−1
)
DD
(
γn ⊗ θ(n)
)
≤ ψ
infi θ
(n)
i
1⊗ θ(n)
≤ ψ supi θ
(n)
i
infi θ
(n)
i
1 ≤ ψν1
by the normal society condition on θ(n). Therefore, we can bound this difference in influence
from above by any constant C > 0 we choose; in particular, for any C > 0:
lim
n→∞P
[∣∣∣∣∣∣((I− A˜n)−1 − (I− A¯n)−1)
DD
(
γ ⊗ θ(n)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
≥ C
]
= 0
Lastly, we know that, (
(I− A˜n)−1 − (I− A¯n)−1
)
DB
0 = 0
Thus, as n→∞, with high probability we have for every µ > 0 and γn:
lim
n→∞P
[∣∣∣∣∣∣D˜(γn)− E[D(γn)]∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≥ µ] = 0
as desired.
Step 3: Under Assumption 2(a), ρ¯DD,nD¯
−1
DD,n has a non-vanishing spectral gap, then for suf-
ficiently large n, we know any two DeGroot agents i and j in the realized network A˜n are con-
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nected with high probability. To see this, we first construct a directed network T as follows:
tij =

[ρ¯nD¯
−1
n ]ij , if i, j ∈ D
0, if i ∈ D, j ∈ B or i ∈ B
1, if i = j ∈ B
The (normalized) Laplacian matrix of the directed network T is given by:
L =
(
0 0
0 I− D¯−1/2DD,nρ¯DD,nD¯−1/2DD,n
)
which has the same |D| largest eigenvalues as I− ρ¯DD,nD¯−1DD,n. We use the result of Chung (2005)
which provides a Cheeger inequality for directed networks: namely, that the conductance of T ,
φ(T ), is bounded below by λT2 /2. Note that φ(T ) = φ(E¯DD,n), and therefore we know that as
n→∞, φ(E¯DD,n) ≥ (1− η)/2 ≡ κ > 0. Since supi,n∈N θ(n)i  1, we know that A¯DD,n is connected
if and only if E¯DD,n is connected; similarly, A˜DD,n is connected w.h.p. if and only if E¯DD,n is.
Consider the network E¯∗DD,n = E¯DD,nD¯n
(
D¯∗n
)−1, where:
[D¯∗n]ij =
{
0, if i 6= j∑
k∈D pik(n), if i = j
Then E¯∗DD,n is symmetric, so by Chung and Radcliffe (2011) and the same reasoning as in Step 1
(along with the fact that E¯∗DD,n and I− L¯∗DD,n have the same eigenvalues), we know that:
||λ˜∗DDµ − λ¯∗DDµ ||2 ≤ 2
√
3 log(4n/ψ)
dDD,(n)
for µ = 1, 2, where dDD,(n) denotes the minimum degree of a DeGroot to other DeGroot agents.
Note that limn→∞ dDD,(n)/ log n = ∞ since E¯n has a non-vanishing spectral gap (and the pre-
vious conductance argument), and limn→∞ d(n)/ log n = ∞ by the expected-degrees condition.
This implies that with high probability, E˜∗DD,n has no vanishing spectral gap, and so using the
standard Cheeger inequality proves that it is connected w.h.p. Since E˜∗DD,n is connected if and
only if E˜DD,n is, we see that E˜DD,n is connected w.h.p. and therefore, the network of DeGroot
agents is connected.
Finally, consider the problem given in Theorem 4 of Mostagir et al. (2019):
Γ∗ = arg max
γ∈{0,1}n−m
n∑
i=m+1
zi − εγi
subject to the condition that zi ≤ Di(γ) + (1 + b)/2 and zi, γi ∈ {0, 1} for all DeGroots i. We
can rewrite zi as the indicator function 1Di(γ)>(1−b)/2. The difference in the objective function
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between the “expected” network and the realized network is:∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=m+1
(
1D˜i(γn)>(1−b)/2 − 1D¯i(γn)>(1−b)/2
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=m+1
1|D˜i(γn)−D¯i(γn)|>β1|D¯i(γn)−(1−b)/2|<β
for any choice of β > 0. By step 2, this implies that as n → ∞, and then β → 0, the difference
in objective functions is upper bounded by
∑n
i=m+1 1D¯i(γn) = (1 − b)/2 which holds for at most
countably many b as n → ∞, and therefore the difference in objective functions is zero for each
γn. Because the principal knows only the random network generation process but not the re-
alized network, there are no differences in the objective function for any given γn. This implies
that the set Γ∗ for the realized influence network A˜n, Γ˜
∗
, and the “expected” influence network
A¯n, Γ¯
∗, are equivalent sets: Γ˜
∗
= Γ¯
∗. Therefore, 0 ∈ Γ˜∗ if and only if 0 ∈ Γ¯∗.
Proof of Theorem 2. For part (a), it is enough to show that for a fixed γn, when pd = ps the min-
imum belief of any DeGroot agent is maximized. First, note that when pd = ps, the beliefs of all
DeGroot agents are the same, say pi∗. For any other pd, the weighted walks to the Bayesian agents
decreases for all DeGroots. Moreover, there must exist some DeGroot agent j whose weighted
walks to agents in {i : γi = 1} has increased. Therefore, agent j’s belief of the state under pd < ps
is strictly less than pi∗, which establishes (a).
For parts (b) and (c), note that when pd → 0, each island is isolated. The belief of the agents
on island ` are given by 1ns`
∑
i∈[`] γi, where [`] is the set of agents on island `. Therefore, the prin-
cipal can manipulate on island ` if and only if ε < ns` · d 2ns`(1−b)e ≡ ε∗` . Once again, by continuity
this holds for sufficiently small pd as well i.e., on some interval (0, pd). It just remains to find p
′
d
such that there is manipulation when ε < min` ε∗` , but for some b there is also manipulation for
some ε′ > min` ε∗` . Consider pd which is the supremum of all pd where there is manipulation if
and only if ε < min` ε∗` (such a pd exists because pd = ps is impervious); call this property Island
Independence. It is clear that island independence is satisfied for all (0, p
d
). Also notice for large
enough n, under island independence either all (DeGroot) agents are manipulated or none are.
Because the influence of the Bayesians is bounded above by a constant fraction strictly less
than 1 (this is maximized when ps = pd), there exists p′d > pd (i.e., p
′
d which violates island in-
dependence) and b such that the principal can manipulate all DeGroots by targeting fewer than∑k
`=1dn(1−b)s`2 e. Thus, there exists an appropriate ε > min` ε∗` where the network with pd ∈ (0, pd)
is impervious but pd ∈ (pd, p′d) is not.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove the case for k = 2 islands; the more general case can be proved
analogously via induction.
Notice the network is susceptible to manipulation (with high probability) if there exists an
agent j with Dj(1) > (1 − b)/2; similarly, the network is impervious to manipulation (with high
probability) if for all agents j,Dj(1) < (1− b)/2. We show that increasing homophily leads to an
increase in the inequality of DeGroot centralities (i.e.,D(1)). We have the system of equations:
n
n− 1w =
2
n(ps + pd)
(
psm1 + pdm2
pdm1 + psm2
)
+
2
n(ps + pd)
(
ps(n/2−m1) pd(n/2−m2)
pd(n/2−m1) ps(n/2−m2)
)
w
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which is equivalent to:
n2
ps + pd
2n− 2 w =
(
psm1 + pdm2
pdm1 + psm2
)
+
(
ps(n/2−m1) pd(n/2−m2)
pd(n/2−m1) ps(n/2−m2)
)
w
Without loss of generality suppose that island 1 has more Bayesian agents (i.e., m1 > m2). Con-
sider the map T given by:
T : w 7→
(
psm1 + pdm2
pdm1 + psm2
)
+
(
ps(n/2−m1) pd(n/2−m2)
pd(n/2−m1) ps(n/2−m2)
)
w
We claim that T has the property that (w1 ≥ w2) =⇒ T (w1) ≥ T (w2). Suppose that w1 ≥ w2,
then:
m1 + w1(n/2−m1) ≥ m2 + w1(n/2−m2)
≥ m2 + w2(n/2−m2)
which moreover implies that
ps(m1 + w1(n/2−m1)) + pd(m2 + w2(n/2−m2)) ≥ pd(m1 + w1(n/2−m1)) + ps(m2 + w2(n/2−m2))
because ps > pd. Because ps, pd, n are fixed, this suggests that (2n−2)/n2(ps+pd) ·T also has this
property, so any fixed point of T must have w1 ≥ w2 by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Since the
system is linear and non-singular, there is a unique fixed-point with w1 ≥ w2. This implies the
DeGroot centrality of the island with more Bayesians is no larger than the DeGroot centrality of
the other island.
For the remainder of this part of the proof, we define a new operator T which maps w,
parametrized by ps, pd, and (m1,m2), respectively. We show the following: (i) T |ps is increas-
ing in ps for w1 but decreasing for w2, (ii) T |pd is decreasing in pd for w1 but increasing for w2,
and (iii) T |(m1,m2) subject to m1 +m2 = m and m1 ≥ m2 is minimized at m1 = m/2. This result
suffices in order to show that there exists a fixed-point of T which obeys the desired properties
of Theorem 3 (by Brouwer21), and by linearity, this fixed-point is unique.
1. Increasing ps: Let us define T as:
T |ps : w 7→ 1
ps + pd
[(
psm1 + pdm2
pdm1 + psm2
)
+
(
ps(n/2−m1) pd(n/2−m2)
pd(n/2−m1) ps(n/2−m2)
)
w
]
Computing directly:
∂T (w1|ps)
∂ps
= pd
(m1 + (n/2−m1)w1)− (m2 + (n/2−m2)w2)
(ps + pd)2
> 0
∂T (w2|ps)
∂ps
= pd
(m2 + (n/2−m2)w2)− (m1 + (n/2−m1)w1)
(ps + pd)2
< 0
where the inequalities follow from the analysis above.
21In particular, let (w1, w2) be the old fixed-point and (w′1, w
′
2) the new fixed point. We illustrate for the case of
increasing ps: all other cases are similar. By increasing ps, we know that T maps all w1 larger and all w2 smaller.
Therefore, the convex compact set [w1, 1]× [0, w2] maps into itself, which implies the new fixed-point (w′1, w′2) lies in
this set.
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2. Increasing pd: Let us define T in the same way as in (1), except parametrized by pd. Then in
exactly the same way:
∂T (w1|pd)
∂pd
=
ps
pd
∂T (w2|ps)
∂ps
< 0
∂T (w2|pd)
∂pd
=
ps
pd
∂T (w1|ps)
∂ps
> 0
which is the desired result.
3. Setting m1 = m2 = m/2: Let us define T as:
T |(m1,m2) : w 7→
[(
psm1 + pdm2
pdm1 + psm2
)
+
(
ps(n/2−m1) pd(n/2−m2)
pd(n/2−m1) ps(n/2−m2)
)
w
]
Let us suppose (m1,m2) = (m/2,m/2). Computing the directional derivative along the
gradient u = (1,−1):
∇uT (w1)|(m1,m2) = ps(1− w1)− pd(1− w2) = (ps − pd)(1− w1) > 0
because w1 = w2 when m1,m2 are equal. This implies that (m1,m2) = (m/2,m/2) is a
local maximum for the DeGroot centralities of agents on island 1 subject to the constraint
w1 ≥ w2. To show that it is a global maximum, we prove there are no other local maxima.
First, notice that
∇uT (w1)|(m1,m2) = ps(1− w1)− pd(1− w2)
∇uT (w2)|(m1,m2) = pd(1− w1)− ps(1− w2)
which implies that ps(1 − w1) − pd(1 − w2) decreases as m1 increases (and m2 increases)
along the direction u:
−ps∇uT (w1)|(m1,m2) + pd∇uT (w2)|(m1,m2) = −p2s(1− w1) + p2d(1− w1)
= −(p2s − p2d)(1− w1) < 0
Therefore, it is impossible for (m∗1,m∗2) and (m∗∗1 ,m∗∗2 ) to exist such that
ps(1− w∗1) + pd(1− w∗2) < 0
ps(1− w∗∗1 ) + pd(1− w∗∗2 ) > 0
with m∗∗1 > m∗1 and m∗∗2 < m∗2 such that m∗1 + m∗2 = m∗∗1 + m∗∗2 = m. There are no other
local maxima, so it just remains to check that (m1,m2) = (m, 0) admits a lower DeGroot
centrality for island 1 (higherw1) than when (m1,m2) = (m/2,m/2). In these cases, we get,
T (w1)|(m, 0) = psm+ ps(n/2−m)w1 + pdnw2/2
T (w1)|(m/2,m/2) = psm/2 + pdm/2 + ps(n−m)w1/2 + pd(n−m)w2/2
= psm/2 + pdm/2 + psnw1/2 + pdnw2/2− (ps + pd)mw1/2
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Observe then that:
T (w1)|(m, 0)− T (w1)|(m/2,m/2) = m(ps − pd)/2−m(ps − pd)w1/2
= m(ps − pd)(1− w1)/2 > 0
Thus, (m1,m2) = (m/2,m/2) is the global maximum for island 1’s DeGroot centrality. Be-
cause there are also no other local maxima, this claim can be generalized to any majoriza-
tion of m (where the island with fewer Bayesians receives Bayesians from the island with
more).
Lastly, we need to argue that in the case of islands of equal size, increased DeGroot centrality
inequality (i.e., the island with larger centrality increases its centrality while the other’s centrality
decreases) cannot make the network go from susceptible to impervious. To check if the network
is impervious, all that needs to be checked is maxiDi(1) > (1− b)/2. When inequality of the De-
Groot centrality increases, then maxiDi(1) increases, and so the above inequality is more likely
to be satisfied when inequality is increased. Therefore, the network can go from impervious to
susceptible, but not the other direction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose there are n agents in the network, and there are m Bayesians.
We denote by w`r the weighted walks from an agent on island ` to any Bayesian on island r. For
` 6= r, we can write:
w`r ≥
(n− 1)pdmr
n2pss` + n2pd(1− s`) +
(
n− 1
n
)(
npss`w
`
r + pd(nsr −mr)wrr + npd
∑
τ 6=r,` sτw
τ
r
npss` + npd(1− s`)
)
≥ (n− 1)pdmr
n2pss` + n2pd(1− s`) +
(
n− 1
n
)(
npss`wr + pd(nsr −mr)(wr + wrr − wr) + npd(1− s` − sr)wr
npss` + npd(1− s`)
)
=
(n− 1)pdmr
n2pss` + n2pd(1− s`) +
(
n− 1
n
)(
wr +
npdsr(w
r
r − wr)− pdmrwrr
npss` + npd(1− s`)
)
=
(n− 1)pdmr
n2pss` + n2pd(1− s`) +
(
n− 1
n2
)(
n(pss` + pd(1− s` − sr))
pss` + pd(1− s`) wr +
pd(nsr −mr)
pss` + pd(1− s`)w
r
r
)
where wr = minτ 6=r wτr . This implies that:
wr ≥
(n− 1)pdmr + (n− 1)pd(nsr −mr)wrr
n2pdsr + n(pss` + pd(1− s` − sr))
Otherwise,
wrr =
(n− 1)psmr
n2pssr + n2pd(1− sr) +
(
n− 1
n
)
ps(nsr −mr)wrr + pd
∑
τ 6=r sτw
τ
r
npssr + npd(1− sr)
≥ (n− 1)psmr
n2pssr + n2pd(1− sr) +
(
n− 1
n
)[
wr +
npssr(w
r
r − wr)− psmrwrr
npssr + npd(1− sr)
]
=
(n− 1)psmr
n2pssr + n2pd(1− sr) +
(
n− 1
n2
)[
npd(1− sr)
pssr + pd(1− sr)wr +
ps(nsr −mr)
pssr + pd(1− sr)w
r
r
]
which moreover implies that
wrr ≥
(n− 1)psmr + (n− 1)npd(1− sr)wr
n2pd(1− sr) + ps[n(mr + sr)−mr]
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Combining these two results we get:
wr ≥
(n− 1)pdmr + (n− 1)pd(nsr −mr) (n−1)psmr+(n−1)npd(1−sr)wrn2pd(1−sr)+ps[n(mr+sr)−mr]
n2pdsr + n(pss` + pd(1− s` − sr))
=⇒ (n2pdsr + n(pss` + pd(1− s` − sr))) (n2pd(1− sr) + ps[n(mr + sr)−mr])wr
≥ (n− 1)pdmr
(
n2pd(1− sr) + ps[n(mr + sr)−mr]
)
+ (n− 1)pd(nsr −mr) ((n− 1)psmr + (n− 1)npd(1− sr)wr)
Note that:
n4p2dsr(1− sr)− n(n− 1)2p2d(nsr −mr)(1− sr) = mp2d(1− sr)(mr(n− 1)2 + n(2n− 1)sr)
Therefore, we can write wr ≥ N(n)/D(n), where:
N(n) ≡(n− 1)pdmr(n2pd(1− sr) + ps[n(mr + sr)−mr]) + (n− 1)2pspd(nsr −mr)mr
D(n) ≡p2d(1− sr)(mr(n− 1)2 + n(2n− 1)sr) + n2pdpssr[n(mr + sr)−mr]
+ n(pss` + pd(1− s` − sr))(n2pd(1− sr) + ps[n(mr + sr)−mr])
But, as n→∞, we can write:
wr ≥
(pd(1− sr) + pssr)mr
(pd(1− sr) + pssr)mr + pss2r + (1− sr)(pss¯+ pd(1− s¯− sr))
=
Armr
Armr + Cr
where s¯ = maxτ∈{1,...,k} sτ and,
Ar ≡ (pd(1− sr) + pssr)
Cr ≡ pss2r + (1− sr)(pss¯+ pd(1− s¯− sr))
From the preliminaries at the beginning of this section and Theorem 1, the network is impervi-
ous as long aswr > (1 + b)/2. Therefore, the network is impervious ifmr ≥ (1+b)Cr(1−b)Ar for any island
r. Taking r∗ ≡ arg max`∈{1,...,k} (1+b)Cr(1−b)Ar , we know that if m ≥
(1+b)Cr∗
(1−b)Ar∗ , the network is impervious
to manipulation.
Proof of Proposition 2. Without loss of generality we assume that the first community in the
network consists entirely of Bayesian agents. We will construct, for each n, a strong homophily
model that is susceptible to manipulation. There will be k = bn/ log2 nc islands each of size
log2 n; this satisfies the expected-degrees condition needed to apply Theorem 1. We assume that
the principal attempts to manipulate the last r communities along the line:
[γ]i ≡
{
1, if S(i) ≤ k − r
0, if S(i) > k − r
where S(i) denotes the island of agent i. We first compute D`(γ) for every island 2 ≤ `(k − r)
by counting Bayesian walks plus walks to DeGroot agents with jammed signals (i.e., γi = 1),
weighted by their θi,n = 1/n; we denote these walks by w` which is equivalent to 1 − D`(γ). For
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2 ≤ ` ≤ (k − r), we have:
w` =
n− 1
n
pd(w`−1 + w`+1) + psw`
2pd + ps
=⇒ w` = (n− 1)pd(w`−1 + w`+1)
2npd + ps
with w1 = 1 because island 1 consists entirely of Bayesian agents and are absorbing states of the
walk. Letting ∆w` = w` − w`−1, we re-arrange and note that for 2 ≤ ` ≤ (k − r):
∆w`+1 = ∆w` +
ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pdw`
Solving for ∆w` explicitly when 2 ≤ ` ≤ (k − r):
∆w` =
ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
`−1∑
τ=2
wτ + (w2 − w1)
We also know that:
w` = w1 +
∑`
κ=2
∆wκ
=w1 +
∑`
κ=2
[
ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
κ−1∑
τ=2
wτ + (w2 − w1)
]
=w1 +
ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
∑`
κ=3
κ−1∑
τ=2
wτ +
∑`
κ=2
(w2 − w1)
=w1 +
ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
`−1∑
τ=2
(`− τ)wτ + (`− 1)(w2 − w1)
We prove by induction that wτ ∼ exp(−ατ/
√
n) for all τ ≤ r, where α = √(ps + 2pd)/pd. As
n→∞, we have:
w` ∼1 + ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
`−1∑
τ=2
(
` exp(−ατ/√n)− τ exp(−ατ/√n))+ (`− 1) (exp(−α/√n)− 1)
∼1 + ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
∫ `−1
2
[
` exp(−ατ/√n)− τ exp(−ατ/√n)] dτ + (`− 1) (exp(−α/√n)− 1)
∼1 + ps + 2pd
(n− 1)pd
√ne−α(1+`)/√n
(
eα(`−1)/
√
n(α(`− 2)−√n) + e2α/
√
n(
√
n− α)
)
α2

+ (`− 1) (exp(−α/√n)− 1)
∼(1− α) +
(
ps + 2pd
pd
)(
α− 1 + e−α`/
√
n
α2
)
∼e−α`/
√
n
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which confirms our inductive hypothesis.
Now, suppose the principal attempts to manipulate r ∼ β√n communities at the end of the
line. By our previous result, we know that wk−r → 0 as n → ∞. Now, let us compute Di(γ)
directly for communities (k − r + 1) ≤ ` ≤ (k − 1); we know that Di(γ) = 1 for all agents i on
island k − r. Furthermore, we can write for all islands (k − r + 1) ≤ ` ≤ (k − 1) the recursion:
D` = n− 1
n
pd(D`−1 +D`+1) + psD`
2pd + ps
which is the exact same recursion we saw before with walks to Bayesian agents and DeGroots
with γi = 1. This implies that D` ∼ exp(−α(` − (k − r))/
√
n), and in particular at the end of the
line:
Dk−1 ∼ exp(−α(r − 1)/
√
n) ∼ exp(−αβ) > 0
Finally, we can write:
Dk = n− 1
n
pdDk−1 + psDk
pd + ps
=⇒ Dk = (n− 1)pdDk−1
npd + ps
∼ exp(−αβ)
For (k − r + 1) ≤ ` ≤ k, the principal will successfully manipulate β√n communities without
even jamming their signals provided that:
D`(χ∗) ≥ exp(−αβ) > 
1 + 
=⇒ β < 1
α
ln
(
1 + −1
)
On the other hand, the communities 2 ≤ ` ≤ λ√n will not be manipulated even though the
principal jams their signals, where λ satisfies:
1−D`(χ∗) ≥ exp(−αλ) > 1
1 + 
=⇒ λ < 1
α
ln(1 + )
Thus, the principal’s limit payoff (as compared to the zero payoff of x = 0) by manipulating all
but the first λ
√
n communities is given by:
n · (1− λ√n/n)− ε(1− β√n/n)
Thus, for some ε bounded away from zero, the principal finds manipulation profitable. Note that
β is increasing in ps and decreasing in pd; therefore, the benefits from manipulation increase as
the degree of first-order homophily in the strong homophily model increases.
Proof of Proposition 3. When ε is small, all that needs to be checked for imperviousness is
maxiDi(1). The optimal Bayesian placement minimizes maxiDi(1) (or equivalently, maximizes
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min`w`). Consider the map T :
T : w 7→


psm1+
∑
` 6=1 pdm`
npss1+npd(1−s1)
· · ·
psmk+
∑
` 6=k pdm`
npssk+npd(1−sk)
+

ps(ns1−m1)
npss1+npd(1−s1)
pd(ns2−m2)
npss1+npd(1−s1) · · ·
pd(nsk−mk)
npss1+npd(1−s1)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
pd(ns1−m1)
npssk+npd(1−sk)
pd(ns2−m2)
npssk+npd(1−sk) · · ·
ps(nsk−mk)
npssk+npd(1−sk)
w

Consider the directional derivative along u:
∇uT (w`) =
u1ps(1− w1) +
∑
`′ 6=` u`′pd(1− w`)
npss` + npd(1− s`)
Consider w`∗ ∈ min`w`; by the above formula (with directional derivative u`∗ = 1, u`∗∗ = −1 for
some `∗∗ and everywhere else zero) adding a Bayesian to this island would increase w`. There-
fore, to maximize the smallest w`, one should figure out the Bayesian placement as to equalize
all w`.
We prove the optimal policy which is to set the Bayesians proportional to population, i.e.,
m` = M · s` by showing this equalizes DeGroot centrality across all of the islands. To see this, we
simply plug in w = w∗1 to T and show it is a fixed point. For island `:
w` =
n− 1
n
· psm` +
∑
`′ 6=` pdm`′ + ps(ns` −m`)w` +
∑
`′ 6=` pd(ns`′ −m`′)w`′
npss` + npd(1− s`)
=
n− 1
n
· pss`M +
∑
`′ 6=` pds`′M + ps(ns` − s`M)w∗ +
∑
`′ 6=` pd(ns`′ − s`′M)w∗
npss` + npd(1− s`)
=
n− 1
n
· M(pss` + pd(1− s`)) + w
∗(npss` + npd(1− s`)−M(pss` + pd(1− s`)))
npss` + npd(1− s`)
=
n− 1
n
· M + w
∗(n−M)
n
The above expression has no dependence on `. Lettingw∗ = (n−1)M(n−1)M+n , we see then thatw` = w
∗,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. When Bayesians are distributed equally, we saw in Proposition 3 that
homophily has no effect (beliefs are the same on every island), so setting pd = pod is optimal, and
always feasible because it costs nothing. By Theorem 2, if each island is all Bayesian or DeG-
root, then the network is impervious for some pd if and only if it is impervious for pd = ps. By
Theorem 3, when ε is small and the islands are equal sizes, decreasing homophily may lead to
imperviousness but not vice-versa, so setting pd = ps is optimal.
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